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THE COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE
BERNARD E. HARCOURT
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1998, fourteen neighborhoods in Chicago
voted to shut down their liquor stores, bars, and lounges, and
four more neighborhoods voted to close down specific taverns.
Three additional liquor establishments were voted shut in Feb-
ruary 1999. Along with the fourteen other neighborhoods that
passed dry votes in 1996 and those that went dry right after Pro-
hibition, to date more than 15% of Chicago has voted itself dry.
The closures affect alcohol-related businesses, like liquor stores
and bars, but do not restrict drinking in the privacy of one's
hoifie. The legal mechanism is an arcane 1933 "vote yourself
dry" law, enacted at the time of the repeal of Prohibition, and
amended by the state legislature in 1995.'
Chicago's temperance movement reflects a fascinating de-
velopment in the legal enforcement of morality. Instead of ar-
guing about morals, the proponents of enforcement are talking
about individual and social harms in contexts where, thirty years
ago, the harm principle would have precluded regulation or
. Associate Professor, University of Arizona College of Law. A.B., Princeton Uni-
versity, 1984; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989; M.A. (Political Science), Harvard Uni-
versity, 1998; Ph.D. Candidate (Political Science), Harvard University. Special thanks
to my colleagues, Joel Feinberg and Toni Massaro, for countless conversations about
this essay; and to Barbara Atwood, Seyla Benhabib, Tom Christiano, Suzie Dovi, David
Garland, JimJacobs, Duncan Kennedy, Andrew Koppelman, Erik Luna, Deborah Ma-
lamud, Chris Maloney, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Cary Nederman, Michael
Sandel, Ted Schneyer, Steve Schulhofer, David Siu, Carol Steiker, Richard Tuck, and
Lloyd Weinreb for generous comments and criticism.
'See Peter Annin, Prohibition Revisited, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1998 at 68; Ray Gibson,
New Anti-Liquor Votes Face Legal Challenge, CI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1999 at N2; Stephen J.
Siegel, A Vote for Quality of Life in Chicago; Linking Alcohol and Blight, Neighborhoods Use
'30s Law to Oust Purveyors, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11, 1998, at A3; Vote Dry Referenda
(NPR Morning Edition,Jan. 11, 1999) (transcript # 99011112-210).
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prohibition. Chicago is a case on point. The closures are part
of Mayor Richard Daley's campaign to revitalize neighborhoods.
The campaign focuses on the harms that liquor-related busi-
nesses produce in a neighborhood, not on the morality or im-
morality of drinking. "People are voting for their pocketbook,
for home values, for church, children and seniors," Mayor Daley
is reported to have said. "This is a quality of life issue, not an at-
tempt to impose prohibition."
2
A similar shift in justification is evident in a wide range of
debates over the regulation or prohibition of activities that have
traditionally been associated with moral offense-from prostitu-
tion and pornography, to loitering and drug use, to homosexual
and heterosexual conduct. In a wide array of contexts, the pro-
ponents of regulation and prohibition have turned away from
arguments based on morality, and turned instead to harm argu-
ments. In New York City, for example, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
has implemented a policy of zero-tolerance toward quality-of-life
offenses, and has vigorously enforced laws against public drink-
ing, public urination, illegal peddling, squeegee solicitation,
panhandling, prostitution, loitering, graffiti spraying, and turn-
stile jumping. According to Mayor Giuliani, aggressive en-
forcement of these laws is necessary to combat serious crime-
murders and robberies-because minor disorderly offenses con-
tribute causally to serious crime. The justification for the en-
forcement policy is the harms that the activities cause, not their
immorality. "[I]f a climate of disorder and lack of mutual re-
spect is allowed to take root," Mayor Giuliani argues, "incidence
of other, more serious antisocial behavior will increase ...
[M]urder and graffiti are two vastly different crimes. But they
are part of the same continuum...."3
2 Editorial, Booze and Ballots, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 4, 1998, at A22.
' Rudolph W. Giuliani, The Next Phase of Quality of Life: Creating a More Civil City
(last modified Feb. 24, 1998) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/98a/quality.
html> (emphasis added) [hereinafter The Next Phase]; see also WilliamJ. Bratton, New
Strategies For Combating Crime in New York City, 23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 781, 785-89
(1996); Rudolph W. Giuliani, An Agenda to Preparefor the Next Century: 1999 State of the
City Address (last modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/
99a/stcitytext.html> (hereinafter 1999 State of the City Address].
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Similarly, in the pornography debate, Professor Catharine
MacKinnon has proposed influential administrative and judicial
measures to regulate pornographic material.4 Her enforcement
proposals, again, are not based on the immorality of pornogra-
phy. Instead, the principal justification is the multiple harms that
pornography and commercial sex cause women. "[T]he evi-
dence of the harm of such material," MacKinnon explains,
"shows that these materials change attitudes and impel behav-
iors in ways that are unique in their extent and devastating in
their consequences."5 MacKinnon's provocative discourse, and
her vivid descriptions of injury, violence, and rape, are all about
harm. In a similar vein, the recent crack-down on commercial
sex establishments-peep shows, strip clubs, adult book and
video stores-in New York City has been justified in the name of
tourism, crime rates, and property value, not morality. As Mayor
Giuliani explains, the campaign to shut down pornography
businesses "will allow people to restore and maintain their
neighborhoods, and protect generations of New Yorkers against
... the destabilization that [sex shops] cause."
A similar development has taken place in the debate over
homosexuality. In the 1980s, the AIDS epidemic became the
harm that justified legal intervention. When San Francisco and
New York City moved to close gay bathhouses in the mid-1980s,
the argument was not about the immorality of homosexual con-
duct. Instead, the debate was about the harm associated with the
potential spread of AIDS at gay bathhouses. Former New York
State Governor Mario Cuomo, who endorsed the strict regula-
tion of gay bathhouses and threatened to close down non-
compliant establishments, emphasized harm, stating: "We know
certain sexual behavior can be fatal. We must eliminate public
establishments which profit from activities that foster this deadly
disease."7 The same argument about harm has been used tojus-
' CATHARNE A. MACKUINON, ONLYWORDS (1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Porno-
graphy, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
'MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 4, at 37.
6 Giuliani, The Next Phase, supra note 3.
Stephanie Saul, N.Y. May Shut Some Bathhouses; Targets Acts That Risk AIDS,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1985, at 4.
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tify the regulation of sexual practices among military personnel
infected with the HIV virus.'
In fact, the focus on harm has become so pervasive that the
concept of harm, today, is setting the very terms of contempo-
rary debate. This is illustrated well, again, in the pornography
context. In response to MacKinnon's proposal to regulate por-
nography, Professor Judith Butler has argued, in her recent
book, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Peformative,9 that the very
etiology of pornography's harm suggests a different remedy.
Butler's argument, in effect, is that the harm to women caused by
pornography is not constitutive, but allows for a spatial and
temporal gap within which personal resistance can be mounted.
Similarly, in striking down MacKinnon's proposed ordinance in
Indianapolis, Judge Frank Easterbrook acknowledged the harm
that pornography causes women. According to Easterbrook, it
is precisely the harm of pornography that "simply demonstrates
the power of pornography as speech," 10 and requires protected
status under the First Amendment. Harm, not morality, struc-
tures the debate.
This is illustrated also in the ongoing controversy over the
legalization of marijuana and other psychoactive drugs. In re-
sponse to a wave of enforcement of anti-drug policies in the
1980s-a wave of enforcement that was justified because of the
harms associated with drug use and the illicit drug trade-the
movement for drug policy reform has increasingly turned to the
argument of "harm reduction." Whereas thirty years ago the op-
ponents of criminalization talked about marijuana use as a "vic-
timless crime"-as not causing harm to others-the opponents
of criminalization now emphasize the harms associated with the
war on drugs. Ethan Nadelmann, the director of an influential
drug reform policy center in New York City, and other reform-
ers have carefully crafted and employed the term "harm reduc-
tion." Their focus is on designing policies that will reduce the
overall harm associated with drug use and drug interdiction
policies. Nadelmann's main argument is that we must "[a] ccept
" See infra Part III.G.
'JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OFTHE PERFORMATIVE (1997).
"0American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985).
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that drug use is here to stay and that we have no choice but to
learn to live with drugs so that they cause the least possible harm.""1
Again, harm, not morality, now structures the debate.
A. A REGENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEBATE OVER THE LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALIY
As we approach the end of the twentieth century, we are
witnessing a remarkable development in the debate over the le-
gal enforcement of morality. The harm principle is effectively
collapsing under the weight of its own success. Claims of harm
have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become
meaningless: the harm principle no longer serves the function
of a critical principle because non-trivial harm arguments perme-
ate the debate. Today, the issue is no longer whether a moral of-
fense causes harm, but rather what type and what amount of
harms the challenged conduct causes, and how the harms com-
pare. On those issues, the harm principle is silent. This is a
radical departure from the liberal theoretic, progressive dis-
course of the 1960s.
" Ethan A. Nadelmann, Learning to Live With Drugs, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1999, at
A21, available in 1999 WL 23312103 (emphasis added). See also Ethan A. Nadelmann,
Perspective on Legalizing Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL
26177307.
2 Although many of the illustrations I will use directly implicate the criminal sanc-
tion-such as, for instance, criminal prosecutions for prostitution, homosexual sod-
omy, public intoxication, drug possession, or fornication (in the case of military
personnel who are HIV positive)-others involve non-criminal measures. Professor
MacKinnon's model ordinance, as well as municipal ordinances closing gay bath-
houses, rely on administrative remedies, not the criminal sanction. Nevertheless, I
will treat all these phenomena under the rubric of "legal regulation" and "legal en-
forcement of morality." The reason is that it is no longer realistic, today, I believe, to
rely on formal labels to distinguish between the different mechanisms (e.g., criminal
fines versus tort remedies, or criminal prohibition versus administrative injunction)
by which the state may attempt to enforce morality. The harm principle applies to all
criminal sanctions, including some, like fines, that resemble too closely private law
remedies. There have been too many recent challenges-intellectual, institutional,
and socio-cultural-to the criminal-civil line to abide by the formal lines drawn by the
legislature between civil and criminal actions. See generally Carol Steiker, Foreword:
Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85
GEO. LJ. 775, 782-97 (1997) (discussing the destabilization of the criminal-civil dis-
tinction and proposing a definition of punishment). In this Article, the non-criminal
sanctions that I discuss are close enough to criminal sanctions to be considered part
of the contemporary debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
1999]
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More formally, in the writings of John Stuart Mill, H.L.A.
Hart and Joel Feinberg, the harm principle acted as a necessary
but not sufficient condition for legal enforcement.'3  The harm
principle was used to exclude certain categories of activities from
legal enforcement (necessary condition), but it did not determine
what to include (but not sufficient condition), insofar as practical,
constitutional or other factors weighed into the ultimate deci-
sion whether to regulate a moral offense. Today, although the
harm principle formally remains a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition, harm is no longer in fact a necessary condition because
non-trivial harm arguments are being made about practically
every moral offense. As a result, today, we no longer focus on
the existence or non-existence of harm. Instead, we focus on
the types of harm, the amounts of harms, and the balance of
harms. As to these questions, the harm principle offers no
guidance. It does not tell us how to compare harms. 4 It served
only as a threshold determination, and that threshold is being
'3 To be sure, insofar as there may have been other limiting principles justifying re-
strictions on liberty, such as the offense principle, the harm principle was not neces-
sarily, strictly speaking, a "necessary" condition. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
Limrrs OF THE CRiMNAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 10, 187 (1984) ("[T] hese proposed
coercion-legitimizing principles do not even purport to state necessary and sufficient
conditions for justified state coercion."). Other conditions, such as offense, may have
justified state coercion. However, when the harm principle is discussed in isolation-
as it is here-it functions as a "necessary but not sufficient condition." It functions as
a consideration that is always a good reason for criminalization, even though there
may be other reasons not to criminalize. See 4JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 323 (1988); see generally infra notes 68-76
and accompanying text. In effect, when discussed in isolation, the harm principle
operates as a necessary but not sufficient condition. See generally Gerald Dworkin, Dev-
lin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 927, 934
(1999); see also Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin on the En-
forcement of Morality, 40 WM. & MARYL. REv. 959, 960 (1999).
,4 Professor Feinberg's work does exclude minor harms from the harm principle,
and does discuss the probability and aggregation of harms. See 1 FEINERG, supra note
13, at 188-202, 215-16 (mediating maxims 4, 5, and 6). In this sense, the harm prin-
ciple does address issues of, for example, the amount of harms. But once a compel-
ling harm argument has been made, the harm principle itself does not determine the
decision whether to prohibit the conduct or how to compare that harm to another
compelling harm. As Feinberg acknowledged, with regard to comparing compelling
harm arguments: "in the end, it is the legislator himself, using his own fallible judg-
ment rather than spurious formulas and 'measurements,' who must compare conflict-
ing interests and judge which are the more important." Id. at 203. See infra notes 280-
82.
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satisfied in most categories of moral offense. As a result, the
harm principle no longer acts today as a limiting principle with
regard to the legal enforcement of morality.
The collapse of the harm principle has significantly altered
the map of liberal legal and political theory in the debate over
the legal enforcement of morality.15 To be sure, the liberal cri-
teria themselves have not changed. As in the 1960s, it is still
possible today to define "liberalism," in the specific context of
the legal enforcement of morality, on the basis of the same
three criteria, namely (1) that it is ajustifiable reason to limit an
individual's freedom of action if their action causes harm to
other persons (the harm principle), (2) that it is also a justifi-
able reason to limit someone's activities in order to prevent se-
rious offense to other persons (the offense principle), and (3)
that it is generally not a justifiable reason to limit harmless con-
duct on the ground that it is immoral. The criteria are the same
today.
But the map of liberalism has changed. In the 1960s and
'70s, liberalism was predominantly progressive16 in relation to
moral offenses: liberal theory was dominated by progressives,
like H.L.A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, and Ronald Dworkin, who were
favorably inclined, by and large, toward the relaxation of sexual
morality in the area of homosexuality, fornication, and pornog-
raphy. In the 1960s and '70s, liberalism was opposed, chiefly, by
moral conservatives, like Lord Patrick Devlin, who were theo-
retically illiberal insofar as they espoused legal moralist princi-
ples. Today, liberalism is the domain of progressives and
conservatives. Conservatives have adopted the harm principle,
" In this Article, I will refer to "liberal political theory," "liberalism," and "illiberal-
ism." I refer to these terms in their technical sense as they have developed in the spe-
cific context of the debate over the legal enforcement of morality, discussed infra at
Part II. I do not intend to comment on the wider debates about political liberalism
or liberalism more generally.
'6 In this article, I also refer to "progressive" and "conservative." Again, I use these
terms in the technical sense developed in the debate over the legal enforcement of
morality. By "progressive," I mean a position that supports the relaxation of sexual
and other morals; for instance, the position supporting the decriminalization of ho-
mosexual sodomy or prostitution, or opposing the regulation or prohibition of drink-
ing. By "conservative," I mean a position that advocates the enforcement of sexual
and other morality. Another term for "conservative" would be "traditionalist."
1999]
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and increasingly are making harm arguments. As a result, lib-
eral theory itself is no longer formally opposed. Liberal theory
has colonized moral conservatism and, it would appear, is being
colonized by conservatives in return. The net effect is the
emergence of what I will call conservative liberalism. The
change can be represented in the following figure:
FIGURE 1: THE EMERGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE LIBERALISM
1960s
Liberal Theory Illiberal Theory
Harm Principle Legal Moralism






The emergence of conservative liberalism represents the
ironic culmination of a long debate between liberal theorists
and their critics. It is ironic because it symbolizes a victory for
both sides. Liberal theory prevails in the sense that the harm
principle is hegemonic-if only in theory. The critics of 1960s
liberalism prevail in the sense that morality gets enforced-if
only under a liberal regime.
B. A STUDY IN LEGAL SEMIOTICS
In this Article, I explore the emergence of conservative lib-
eralism and the effective collapse of the harm principle. My
goal is to bridge, on the one hand, the legal and political theo-
retic discussion of the harm principle and, on the other, the ac-
tual arguments being made by activists, lawyers, academics,
judges, politicians, and cultural critics. The project is to dem-
onstrate how debates in the philosophy of law influence legal
and political rhetoric, and how the latter, in turn, impact philo-
sophical principle. It is a project about legal rhetoric, or more
116 [Vol. 90
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precisely about the interplay between legal philosophic and
practical legal rhetoric. It is not my intention, by any means, to
suggest that legislators enact or repeal, that judges uphold or
strike down, or that law enforcement officials enforce or ignore
laws prohibiting moral offenses because of legal and political jus-
tifications concerning the harm principle. Other factors-po-
litical, social, cultural, and historical-may also, and more
importantly, influence the implementation of the criminal law.
In this sense, the project is situated within an already exist-
ing and substantial body of scholarship addressing legal argu-
ment.17 This project is nevertheless distinctive in three ways:
first, it explores the dynamic relationship between two discipli-
nary discourses; second, it investigates the historical evolution of
the arguments in these two disciplines; and third, it focuses on
the ambiguity within the structure of argumentation-the
struggle over the meaning of harm-that accounts for the
change in the structure of the debate itself. This project is in-
tended to build on and contribute to existing theories of legal
argument.
Although there is substantial disagreement in the literature
over the political implications of the study of legal rhetoric,8 the
writings in the field are in significant agreement over the basic
building blocks of legal argumentation-the pairing of legal ar-
17 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L.
Rlv. 869 (1993); J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831
(1991); J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 200-01 (1990);
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, 133-56, 344-46 (1997); Duncan Ken-
nedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. Ray. 75 (1991); Jeremy Paul, The
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1779 (1991); and articles cited in Kennedy, A
Semiotics of Legal Argument supra, at 105 n.4.
'8 See Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note 17, at 1848-51 (arguing that
legal semiotics should not be interpreted as undermining the authenticity of legal ar-
gument and that its politics "will be the politics of postmodernity." Balkin explains:
"[b]y this I mean that [legal semiotics] rests on the social construction of subjectivity
and insists that older ways of looking at the subject must be revised."); KENNEDY, A
CRrIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 17, at 345-46 (arguing that legal semiotics
awakens feelings of contradiction, irony and doubleness, and "the potential excite-
ment of their inclusion" in thinking about law); Paul, supra note 17 at 1826-30 (argu-
ing that legal semiotics offers a significant contribution to progressive politics,
especially in critiquing the argument of meritocracy).
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guments,' 9 the operations that can be performed on legal argu-
ments, ° and the "nesting" or "crystalline structure" of legal ar-
guments2 -and, more generally, about the way in which
meaning is produced through legal argumentation.22 The ambi-
tion of the field is to "identify what might be called the 'gram-
mar' of legal discourse-the acceptable moves available in the
language game of legal discourse," to "trace[] the way that the
system produces meaning," and to "see the gaps or uncertainties
within the structure. 23
It is within this framework that this Article will explore the
historical transformation of the harm principle in legal philoso-
phy and rhetoric. I will sketch here the broad outline of this
transformation. The Hart-Devlin debate was originally mapped
onto a traditional pairing of two arguments-the harm princi-
ple and legal moralism-that had structured the debate in the
nineteenth century. The several ambiguities in Lord Devlin's
writings, however, fractured the conservative position and
gradually gave way to the predominance of the harm principle
in legal philosophical discourse. The resulting disequilibrium
in both philosophy of law and substantive criminal law scholar-
ship significantly influenced the arguments of activists, lawyers,
and politicians in the struggle over the legal enforcement of
morality. Proponents of regulation and prohibition began to
" This refers to the recurring forms of opposition among paired legal arguments.
See, e.g., Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note 17, at 1835; Kennedy, A Semiot-
ics of Legal Argument, supra note 17, at 78-80; Paul, supra note 17, at 1781 n.6, 1786-95.
This refers to the recurring ways in which people respond to legal arguments,
such as for instance "flipping" the implication of your opponent's argument. See, e.g.,
Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note 17, at 1834; Kennedy, A Semiotics of Le-
gal Argument, supra note 17, at 87-88; Paul, supra note 17, at 1798-1807.
2 This refers to the reproduction, at different levels of the legal argument, of the
same structure of opposed legal arguments. See, e.g.,J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Struc-
ture of Legal Thought 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argu-
ment, supra note 17, at 97-100 (using the term "nesting").
' This body of work generally argues that meaning is derived from, and changes
based on, the interplay of legal arguments. Balkin explains that "the purpose of se-
miotic study is to understand the system of signs which creates meaning within a cul-
ture. It is to understand the underlying structures that make meaning possible."
Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note 17, at 1845; see also, Balkin, Ideological
Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, supra note 17, at 870-72; Kennedy, A Semiotics of Le-
gal Argument, supra note 17, at 105-16.
' Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note 17, at 1845.
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employ increasingly harm arguments in support of a conserva-
tive agenda. The harm principle, traditionally associated with
progressive politics, began to have an increasingly conservative
tilt. It underwent an ideological shift-or what Professor Jack
Balkin would call "ideological drift., 24 This shift altered the ear-
lier pairing of arguments within legal rhetoric,2 and signifi-
cantly changed the meaning and effectiveness of the progressive
26counter-arguments. It affected the whole system of meaning.
The original progressive political valence of the harm prin-
ciple, as well as the contemporary conservative tilt, are the
products of particular historical and political contexts. The
harm principle was originally deployed by progressive liberals,
John Stuart Mill and H.L.A. Hart, in opposition to morally con-
servative judges, Lords James Stephen and Patrick Devlin. The
contemporary conservative tilt is the result of the strategic de-
ployment of harm arguments by proponents of legal enforce-
ment.
The shift has had a dramatic effect on the structure of the
debate. It has, in effect, undermined the structure itself. In
contrast to the earlier pairing of harm and legal moralist argu-
ments, or even to the later dominance of the harm argument
over legal moralism, today the debate is no longer structured. It
is, instead, a harm free-for-all: a cacophony of competing harm
arguments without any way to resolve them. There is no argu-
ment within the structure of the debate to resolve the compet-
24 Ideological drift occurs when a political or legal idea changes political valence.
Here, the harm principle, which was originally progressive, acquires a conservative tilt
as more and more proponents of enforcement make convincing harm arguments
about moral offenses. Ideological drift occurs, Balkin explains, "because political,
moral, and legal ideas are and can only be made public through signs that must be
capable of iteration and reiteration in a diverse set of new moral, legal, and political
contexts." Id. at 1833; see generally Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning,
supra note 17.
"This is a good illustration of Balkin's claim that "history deconstructs'-by which
he means that history can provide the contextual change that results in an idea ac-
quiring different political valence. See Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, supra note
17, at 1834.
26 See KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 17, at 343. As Kennedy
explains, this is because the new argument (or what Kennedy refers to as "argument-
bite") "changes arguers' conscious or unconscious expectations about what will be
said in response to those bites." Id.
1999]
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ing claims of harm. The only real contender would have been
the harm principle. But that principle provides no guidance to
compare harm arguments. Once a non-trivial harm argument
has been made and the necessary condition of harm has been
satisfied, the harm principle has exhausted its purpose. The
triumph and universalization of harm has collapsed the very
structure of the debate.
There is, however, no reason for despair. Another structure
will surely emerge. Insofar as it may continue to revolve around
the idea of harm, the collapse of the harm principle may in fact
be beneficial. It may increase our appreciation that there is
harm in most human activities. By highlighting harms, the col-
lapse of the harm principle may help us make more informed
arguments and reach more informed decisions. It may also
help us tailor more appropriate remedies when we do decide to
regulate challenged conduct. In the end, the collapse of the
harm principle may be a good thing.
II. THE RISE OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE
The harm principle traces back to John Stuart Mill's essay
On Liberty.27 Mill succinctly stated the principle in a now-famous
passage in the opening pages of the essay:
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as enti-
tled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the
way of compulsion and control .... That principle is that the sole end
for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfer-
ing with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
2JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). The
harm principle has its roots in earlier liberal theory, especially in early liberal defini-
tions of liberty. See e.g., THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 145.-47 (Richard Tuck ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) ("Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth (properly) the
absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of mo-
tion;)."); JOHN LocIK, Two TREAnsEs OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (Freedom of men under government is "[a] Liberty
to follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be sub-
ject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man."). For
present purposes, though, it makes sense to begin the discussion with John Stuart
Mill. For background discussion of the harm principle, see generally Kent Greenawalt,
LegalEnforcement of Moraliy, 85J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710, 715, 722-25 (1995).
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any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.8
Though simple at first blush, the harm principle actually
was far more complicated than it looked, and, over the course
of the essay, it took on many nuances. The argument in fact be-
came more complex with each restatement. In Mill's short es-
say, the harm principle metamorphosed from a simple inquiry
into harm, to a more complex analysis of interests (self-
regarding and other regarding interests),2 and eventually to a
quasi-legal determination of rights. In his final restatement of
the harm principle, Mill ultimately defined the concept of harm
on the basis of recognized or legal rights. Mill wrote:
Though society is not founded on a contract... the fact of living in
society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a
certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct consists, first, in
not injuring the interests of one another, or rather certain interests which, ei-
ther by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as
rights;, and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on
some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for de-
fending the society or its members from injury and molestation.
30
As Mill explained elsewhere, the notion of rights embodied in
this final restatement rested on a modified utilitarian calculus
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive
being.
In Mill's writings, then, the original, simple harm principle
evolved into a more cumbersome principle. Mill nevertheless
applied the principle and justified, on its basis, a large number
of regulations and prohibitions. The harm principle, in Mill's
own hands, produced a blueprint for a highly regulated society:
a society that regulated the sale of potential instruments of
crime, that taxed the sale of alcohol and regulated the public
2MILL, supra note 27, at 9.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 10. For a discussion of Mill's emphasis on human self-development, see
generally: FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUsTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STuART MILL, 229-30 (1984); WENDY DONNER, THE
LIBERAL SELF: JOHN STUART MRL's MORAL AND PoLr cAL PHILOSOPHY 188-97 (1991);
Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHics 852,




consumption of alcohol, that regulated education and even
procreation, and that prohibited public intoxication and inde-
32cency.
Beginning at least in the 1950s, liberal theorists, most
prominently Professors H.L.A. Hart andJoel Feinberg, returned
to Mill's original, simple statement of the harm principle. The
context was the debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
In England, this debate was reignited by the recommendation
of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
(the "Wolfenden Report") that private homosexual acts be-
tween consenting adults no longer be criminalized.33  In the
United States, the debate was reignited by the Supreme Court's
struggle over the definition and treatment of obscenity'4 and the
drafting of the Model Penal Code.5 In both countries, the de-
bate was fueled by the perception among liberal theorists that
legal moralist principles were experiencing a rejuvenation and
were threatening to encroach on liberalism. More than anyone
else, Lord Patrick Devlin catalyzed this perceived threat. In his
Maccabaean Lecture, delivered to the British Academy in 1959,
Lord Devlin argued that purportedly immoral activities, like
homosexuality and prostitution, should remain criminal of-
fenses.36 Lord Devlin published his lecture and other essays un-
der the title The Enforcement of Morals, and Devlin soon became
associated with the principle of legal moralism-the principle
that moral offenses should be regulated because they are im-
moral.
The Hart-Devlin exchange structured the debate over the
legal enforcement of morality, and thus there emerged, in the
1960s, a pairing of two familiar arguments-the harm principle
32 MILL, supra note 27, at 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 107.
"REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957,
Cmnd. 247, para. 61, 62. For the history of sodomy laws in England, see generally
Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Proposals for Progress: Sodomy Laws and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 21 BROOK J. INT'LL. 425, 428-32 (1995).
' See Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986,
986-87 (1966).
"THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 4 (1983).
-PATRICK DEvuN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1
(1965).
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and legal moralism. All the participants at the time recognized,
naturally, that this structure was a recurrence of a very similar
pairing of arguments that had set the contours of the debate a
hundred years earlier.3 7 The Hart-Devlin debate replicated, in
many ways, the earlier debate between Mill and another famous
British jurist, LordJames Fitzjames Stephen. In 1873, in a book
entitled Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,- Lord Stephen had published
a scathing attack on Mill's essay and strenuously advocated legal
moralism. Stephen described his argument as "absolutely in-
consistent with and contradictory to Mr. Mill's."39 Stephen's ar-
gument, like Mill's, was best captured in a now-famous passage:
"[T] here are acts of wickedness so gross and outrageous that,
self-protection apart, they must be prevented as far as possible at
any cost to the offender, and punished, if they occur, with ex-
emplary severity. 40
Professor Hart immediately underscored the similar struc-
ture of the emerging debate. "Though a century divides these
two legal writers," Hart observed, referring to Lords Stephen
and Devlin, "the similarity in the general tone and sometimes
in the detail of their arguments is very great., 4' In his defense,
Devlin responded that at the time he delivered the Maccabaean
lecture he "did not then know that the same ground had al-
ready been covered by Mr. Justice Stephen .... ,42 Nevertheless,
Devlin conceded that there was "great similarity between [Lord
Stephen's] view and mine on the principles that should affect
the use of the criminal law for the enforcement of morals. 43
Devlin also noted the similarity between Hart, Mill, and the
' See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 669, 670 n.1 (1963) ("The recent controversy traverses much the same ground as
was surveyed in the nineteenth century.") (citing the Mill-Stephen debate).
"JAMES FrTZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBER Y, EQUAirX', FRATERNrIY (R.J. White ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873).
Id. at 162.
40Id, This passage is most frequently excerpted in discussions of Stephen. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBEPRY AND MORALITY, 60-61 (1963); Feinberg, Moral Enforcement
and the Harm Principle (from SoCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1973)), reprinted in ETMICS AND
PUBLCPoucy 291 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., 1975).
4, HART, supra note 40, at 16.




Wolfenden Report." Referring to the Wolfenden Report, Dev-
lin observed that "this use of the [harm] principle is, as Profes-
sor Hart observed, 'strikingly similar' to Mill's doctrine."45
A. LORD DEVLIN AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE
CONSERVATIVE POSITION
Though the paired structure of arguments was similar, it
was not exactly the same. In contrast to Stephen's straightfor-
ward legal moralist argument, Lord Devlin's argument in The
Enforcement of Morality was ambiguous and susceptible to com-
peting interpretations. Devlin's argument played on the am-
bivalence in the notion of harm-at times courting the idea of
social harm, at other times aligning more closely with the legal
moralism of his predecessor. As a result, the conservative posi-
tion began to fragment and there developed at least two inter-
pretations of Devlin's argument: the first relied on public harm,
the second on legal moralism. Professors Hart and Feinberg la-
beled these two versions, respectively, the moderate thesis and
the extreme thesis. 6
In large part, the source of the ambiguity stemmed from the
fact that Devlin defined public morality in terms of harm to society.
In several key passages, Devlin strongly suggested that public
morality necessarily encompassed conduct that affected society
as a whole. Devlin wrote, for instance, that "[t]here is a case for
a collective [moral] judgement . . . only if society is affected.
4 7
"[B] efore a society can put a practice beyond the limits of toler-
ance," Devlin emphasized, "there must be a deliberate judge-
ment that the practice is injurious to society.'" 8  In these and
numerous other passages, 49 Devlin made clear that public moral-
" Id. at 105. At other points, though, Devlin also tried to distinguish Hart from
Mill. See e.g, id. at 124-26.
Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
"HART, supra note 40, at 48; Feinberg, supra note 40, at 289-93.
DEVLIN, supra note 36, at 8 (emphasis added).4 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., id. at 15 ("Immorality then, for the purpose of the law, is what every
right-minded person is presumed to consider to be immoral. Any immorality is capa-
ble of affecting society injuriously and in effect to a greater or lesser extent it usually
does; this is what gives the law its locus standi."); id. at 17-18 ("It becomes then a ques-
tion of balance, the danger to society in one scale and the extent of the restriction in
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ity would necessarily involve injury to society, and that the injury
was precisely "what gives the law its locus standi."s° This overlap
of harm and morality significantly exacerbated the ambiguity in
the debate, and the struggle for the meaning of harm.
The overlap fragmented the conservative argument. Under
the moderate interpretation, Devlin appeared to be arguing
that morality should be enforced in order to protect society
from the danger of disintegration-an argument that relied on
harm.51 On this view, the only difference between Hart and
Devlin was that Hart focused on harm to the individual, whereas
Devlin focused on harm to society as a whole. It was precisely
on this ground that Devlin criticized the Wolfenden Report.
Devlin wrote:
The error of jurisprudence in the Wolfenden Report is caused by
the search for some single principle to explain the division between
crime and sin. The Report finds it in the principle that the criminal law
exists for the protection of individualr, on this principle fornication in pri-
vate between consenting adults is outside the law and thus it becomes
logically indefensible to bring homosexuality between consenting adults
in private within it. But the true principle is that the law exists for the pro-
tection of society. It does not discharge its function by protecting the indi-
vidual from injury, annoyance, corruption, and exploitation; the law must
protect also the institutions and the community of ideas, political and moral,
without which people cannot live together. Society cannot ignore the morality
of the individual any more than it can his loyalty; it flourishes on both
and without either it dies.
52
One obvious flaw in the moderate interpretation was that
Devlin never defined the causal mechanism of social harm.
the other."); id at 22 ("Adultery of the sort that breaks up marriage seems to me to
be just as harmful to the social fabric as homosexuality or bigamy.") (emphasis added).
Id. at 15.
Feinberg similarly suggests that Devlin's moderate thesis "is really an application
of the public harm principle." Feinberg, supra note 40, at 289. In my opinion, Pro-
fessorJeffrie Murphy's reading of Devlin is also consistent with the moderate thesis of
public harm. SeeJeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73,
76 (1995) ("Devlin is not a legal moralist. He is rather a utilitarian, democratic cynic
with some controversial empirical views. Utilitarian because he regards social harm-
fulness, in some very extended sense, as the only factor relevant in justifying a crimi-
nal prohibition."). Professor Robert George similarly interprets Devlin as making a
public harm argument. See Robert P. George, Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement
of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin Debate, 35 AM.J. JuRS. 15, 19 (1990). See
also Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 722 (offering a consequentialist interpretation of
Devlin).
2DEVUN, supra note 36, at 22 (emphases added).
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Though Devlin repeatedly referred to "social disintegration," he
failed to articulate the pathway of harm. As a result, there de-
veloped, again, a number of competing interpretations of the
causal mechanism-which, in part, replicated the ambiguities in
the conception of harm. Hart, at one point, suggested that Dev-
lin believed that individuals who deviate from sexual morality
are likely to deviate in other ways and thereby to cause society
harm.3 At another point, Hart suggested that the causal
mechanism was simply change: that Devlin equated society with
its morality "so that a change in its morality is tantamount to the
destruction of a society. ' 54 Feinberg emphasized the metaphor
of morality as a kind of "seamless web" and interpreted the
causal mechanism as the unraveling of that "moral fabric."'5
Professor Jeffrie Murphy offered yet another interpretation:
"one might. . . argue," he suggested, "that open toleration of
the flouting of sexual norms threatens the honorific position
historically accorded the traditional nuclear family and that
such a threat risks undermining the social stability generated by
such family units."5 6 Devlin never really clarified his position.
"' HART, supra note 40, at 51 ("[Morality] forms a single seamless web, so that those
who deviate from any part are likely or perhaps bound to deviate from the whole.");
see id. ("But there is again no evidence to support, and much to refute, the theory that
those who deviate from conventional sexual morality are in other ways hostile to soci-
ety.").
"' Id. at 51. This led, of course, to Devlin's response, and an entirely fruitless se-
mantic debate over the concept of society. See DEvLrN, supra note 36, at 13 n.1. At
still another point, Hart suggested that the mechanism turned on a Durkheimian
conception of social solidarity: that private immoral acts loosen the moral bonds that
bring men and women together in society and thereby "threaten[] the moral princi-
ples on which society is based." HART, supra note 40, at 53.
1
5 Feinberg, supra note 40, at 289.
16 Murphy, supra note 51, at 77. Other interpretations were offered. See, e.g.,
George, supra note 51, at 30-36 (offering an interpretation of social disintegration in
terms of "the loss of a distinctive form of interpersonal integration in community un-
derstood as something worthwhile for its own sake").
I would suggest that a close reading of Devlin's Morals and the Criminal Law sug-
gests yet another possibility. Devlin repeatedly suggested that, if the structure of law
was not supported by our moral sentiments, then the law "forfeits respect." DELIN,
supra note 36, at 2, 24. In forfeiting respect, the law loses legitimacy. This seems to
capture best the mechanism at work in Devlin's discussion of homosexuality. Male
homosexuality, according to Devlin, engenders a moral reaction of "deeply felt and
not manufactured" "disgust," "a real feeling of reprobation," and "a general abhor-
rence." Id. at 17. When we look at it "calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a
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Another major problem with the moderate interpretation
was that Devlin ignored completely the empirical dimension of
the public harm claim.5 7 "[N] o evidence is produced," Hart ex-
claimed.58 "No reputable historian has maintained this thesis,
and there is indeed much evidence against it. As a proposition
of fact it is entitled to no more respect than the EmperorJustin-
ian's statement that homosexuality was the cause of earth-
quakes."5 9 Four years later, Professor Ronald Dworkin sounded
the same refrain: "[Lord Devlin] manages this conclusion with-
out offering evidence that homosexuality presents any danger at
all to society's existence .... .60
vice so abominable that its mere presence is an offence." I& If the law does not re-
flect this deep sense of moral offense, then the law will no longer be perceived as le-
gitimate. It will forfeit respect. Legitimization may have been the causal mechanism
at work.
Bill Miller's discussion in The Anatomy of Disgust resonates well with this interpreta-
tion of Devlin. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, TI ANATOMY OF DISGUST, 179-80
("[W hether we be Puritan or not, we express many of our bread-and-butter moral
judgments in the idiom of disgust. The argument is not whether disgust operates in
the moral domain, but about its proper scope, its proper object, and its reliability in
that domain."). See also id. at 180 ("By being so much in the gut, the idiom of disgust
has certain virtues for voicing moral assertions. It signals seriousness, commitment,
indisputability, presentness, and reality. It drags the moral down from the skies to-
ward which it often tends to float, wrests it from the philosophers and theologians,
and brings it back to us with a vengeance."). It seems that Devlin's writings would be
an excellent illustration of many of Miller's points. There is also a similar ambiva-
lence about disgust in the writings of Miller and Devlin: disgust is at the core of mo-
rality, but it is not its foundation. It reflects moral judgment, but should not ground
moraljudgment. Thus Miller writes that "[d]isgust tends to be a little too zealous in
its moral work. It wants to draw things into the moral domain that we feel in our bet-
ter judgment should be left out." I& at 181. The same ambivalence is reflected in
Devlin. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 36, at 17 ("Those who are dissatisfied with the
present law on homosexuality often say that the opponents of reform are swayed sim-
ply by disgust. If that were so it would be wrong, but I do not think one can ignore
disgust if it is deeply felt and not manufactured.").
', Even Devlin's supporters acknowledge the absence of empirical evidence. See,
e.g., Dworkin, supra note 13, at 931 ("The trouble with many of Devlin's claims is the
same as that faced by the strategic theorist who, when asked about his various 'calcu-
lated risks,' admitted that he had never done the calculations."); Murphy, supra note
51, at 77 ("Devlin on these issues seems to rely more on hunches than on solid evi-
dence.").
' HART, supra note 40, at 50.
59 Id.
0 Dworkin, supra note 34, at 992. See also Rolf E. Sartorius, The Enforcement of Mo-
rality, 81 YA.E LJ. 891, 893 (1972) ("[A]s Hart has convincingly argued on a number
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The empirical gap in Devlin's harm argument was terribly
damaging, and, as a result, a second, more extreme reading of
Devlin emerged . Under the second interpretation, referred to
as the extreme thesis, Devlin argued that morality should be en-
forced for the sake of morality tout court: morality for morality's
sake. If Devlin's claim (that private acts of immorality present a
danger to society) was not intended to be an empirical claim,
Hart suggested, then Devlin equated morality with society. "On
this view the enforcement of morality is not justified by its valu-
able consequences in securing society from dissolution or de-
cay," Hart argued. "It is justified simply as identical with or
required for the preservation of the society's morality.,
62
Under the more extreme reading, Devlin's argument was
much closer to the earlier statement of legal moralism in Lord
Stephen's book, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.63 Certain key pas-
sages in Devlin's writings supported this reading, especially the
concluding sentence of the Maccabaean lecture:
So the law must base itself on Christian morals and to the limit of its
ability enforce them, not simply because they are the morals of most of
us, nor simply because they are the morals which are taught by the estab-
lished Church-on these points the law recognizes the right to dissent-
but for the compelling reason that without the help of Christian teaching the law
will fail.64
These were ominous and somewhat bewildering words.
"Christian morals." "The law will fail." To what extent was this a
prediction of actual social harm or a traditional argument about
legal moralism? Could they even be distinguished anymore?
Was legal moralism, in reality, a harm argument? In which di-
of separate occasions, the empirical assumption that it must legislate sexual morality
in order to avoid disintegration is simply without foundation.") (footnote omitted).
61 HART, supra note 40, at 55.
62 Id. Hart argued, against the extreme thesis, that it rested on a vindictive, de-
nunciatory, and hateful theory of punishment that contravened "the critical princi-
ple, central to all morality, that human misery and the restriction of freedom are
evils." Id. at 82. Joel Feinberg also argued against the extreme thesis. Feinberg em-
phasized the costs of such a policy, in terms of individual privacy and other human
values ("loss of spontaneity, stunting of rational powers, anxiety, [and] hypocrisy").
Feinberg argued that these costs far outweighed any possible benefit: "The price of
securing mere outward conformity to the community's standards (for that is all that
can be achieved by the penal law) is exorbitant." Feinberg, supra note 40, at 292.
'STEPHEN, supra note 38.
" DEvLIN, supra note 36, at 25 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 90
COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PP7NCPLE
rection was Devlin going? Unsure, Hart and other liberal theo-
rists returned to Mill's essay On Liberty and to the original, sim-
ple statement of the harm principle. Ironically, that rhetorical
move would further ambiguate the conception of harm. The
simplicity of the original harm principle would veil an intense
struggle for the meaning of harm.
B. H.L.A. HART, JOEL FEINBERG, AND THE ORIGINAL SIMPLE HARM
PRINCIPLE
In Law, Liberty, and Morality, a set of lectures delivered at
Stanford University in 1962 in response to Lord Devlin, Hart
rehearsed Mill's harm principle, but carefully pared the argu-
ment down to its original, simple, and succinct statement. Right
after posing the central question of his lectures-"Ought im-
morality as such to be a crime?"-Hart immediately cited Mill in
support of his position. "To this question," Hart responded,
'John Stuart Mill gave an emphatic negative answer in his essay
On Liberty one hundred years ago, and the famous sentence in
which he frames this answer expresses the central doctrine of his essay."
Then Hart repeated the famous sentence: "He said, 'The only
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent
harm to others."' Hart endorsed the simple harm argument,r
and declared that, "on the narrower issue relevant to the en-
forcement of morality Mill seems to me to be right."67
Similarly, in an early essay in 1973 entitled Moral Enforcement
and the Harm Principle-an essay which would sketch the con-
tours of his later four-volume treatise on The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law--Professor Joel Feinberg rehearsed Mill's harm
principle and he, too, pared the principle down to its original,
simple formulation.& Feinberg emphasized the importance of
' HART, supra note 40, at 4 (emphasis added).
Hart qualified his endorsement insofar as he supplemented the harm principle
with an offense principle. It is not clear, however, that Mill would have disagreed
with Hart, since the Millian notion of other-regarding conduct seems to embrace
both the harm principle and the offense principle.
6 HART, supra note 40, at 5.
See generally Feinberg, supra note 40.
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distinguishing between direct and indirect harn, but went no
further, at the time, in developing the harm argument. Fein-
berg endorsed the argument7 ° and wrote that the distinction, "as
Mill intended it to be understood, does seem at least roughly
serviceable, and unlikely to invite massive social interference in
private affairs.'
'
Eleven years later, Feinberg published the first volume of
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, entitled Harm to Others.
Feinberg explored there the contours of the harm principle and
developed fifteen supplementary criteria, or what he called
"mediating maxims," to assist in the application of the harm
principle.72 Throughout the four-volume treatise, Feinberg
maintained that the harm argument, as refined by the mediat-
ing maxims, was one of only two considerations (the other be-
ing the offense principle) that were always a good reason for
prohibiting purportedly immoral activity.
Feinberg's experience with the harm principle mirrored, in
significant ways, Mill's own experience." Like Mill, Feinberg's
confidence in the robustness of the original harm principle
eroded somewhat over the course of his writings. Whereas
Feinberg originally defined liberalism, in his own words,
"boldly, 7 4 relying exclusively on the harm principle (supple-
mented by an offense principle),-' Feinberg concluded the
'9 Id. at 284.7 0 Feinberg also supplements the harm principle with an offense principle. See id.
at 297; see also 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMrrs OF TBE CRiMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS 49 (1985).
7' Feinberg, supra note 40, at 286.
2 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 214-17, 243-45.
" Joel Feinberg himself acknowledges the strong similarity, in terms of the in-
creased complexity of the harm principle, between his work and Mill's. Conversation
with Joel Feinberg (Oct. 14, 1998). In his treatise, Feinberg specifically remarked
that "[a] t first sight, the harm principle seems a straightforward and unproblematic
guide to legislative decision-making." But, he noted, "[t]he analysis proposed in this
and the preceding chapters, however, reveals that harm is a very complex concept
with hidden normative dimensions .... " 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 214.
74 4 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 323-24.
7' Feinberg's original definition of liberalism posited that the harm and offense
principles were exclusive. He wrote:
We can define liberalism in respect to the subject matter of this work as the view that the
harm and offense principles, duly clarified and qualified, between them exhaust the class
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fourth and last volume of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law by
softening his claims about the critical role of the harm princi-
ple. But even under the more cautious version proposed by
Feinberg at the end of his treatise, the qualified harm principle
still played a dominant role. Feinberg concluded his treatise
with the following "cautious" definition of liberalism:
[W]e can define liberalism cautiously as the view that as a class, harm
and offense prevention are far and away the best reasons that can be
produced in support of criminal prohibitions, and the only ones that
frequently outweigh the case for liberty. They are, in short, the only
considerations that are always good reasons for criminalization. The other
principles [moralist or paternalist] state considerations that are at most
sometimes (but rarely) good reasons, depending for example on exactly
what the non-grievance evil is whose prevention is supposed to support
criminalization.
As this passage makes clear, the original harm principle re-
mained, even by the end of Feinberg's treatise, one of the two
main limits on state regulation of moral offenses.
Gradually, over the course of the 1960s, '7 0s, and '80s, Mill's
famous sentence began to dominate the legal philosophic de-
bate over the enforcement of morality. Harm became the criti-
cal principle used to police the line between law and morality
within Anglo-American philosophy of law. Most prominent
theorists who participated in the debate either relied on the
harm principle or made favorable reference to the argument.
Professor Ronald Dworkin engaged the Hart-Devlin debate in
an article first published in the Yale Law Journal in 1966 entitled
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of MoralS.7 Although Dworkin fo-
cused on the implications for democratic theory-arguing that
legislators must ultimately decide whether the community has
of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Paternalistic and moralistic consid-
erations, when introduced as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all.
1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 14-15. See also 4 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 321.
76 4 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 323. Feinberg goes on to say:
Indeed there are some extraordinary, and up to now only hypothetical examples of non-
grievance evils (neither harms nor offenses, nor right-violations of any kind) that are so se-
rious that even the liberal (if he is sensitive and honest) will concede that their prevention
would be a good reason for criminalization, and in the most compelling examples of all,
perhaps even a good enough reason, on balance, for criminalization.
Id. at 324.




expressed a reasoned moral position about purportedly im-
moral activities 78-Dworkin presented the harm principle as a
leading response in the debate.7 9 Professor Louis Henkin simi-
larly joined the debate, with specific reference to the question
of obscenity. Although Henkin, like Dworkin, took a different
approach to the question-emphasizing the constitutional di-
mensions of laws enforcing claims of morality that have their
roots in religious principles-Henkin also sided with Hart
against Devlin. "By my hypotheses," Henkin noted in conclu-
sion, "the United States would be a polity nearer the heart of
Professor Hart, and ofJohn Stuart Mill."8
Over time, the harm principle essentially prevailed in the
legal philosophic debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
From one end of the spectrum to the other, there arose a con-
sensus that Hart had carried the day. At the liberal end of the
spectrum, Professor Ronald Dworkin reported that Devlin's ar-
gument "was widely attacked" and that his thesis was, ultimately,
"very implausible. On the other end of the spectrum, Profes-
sor Robert George would report that "many ... perhaps even
,,12
most [commentators] think that Hart carried the day ....
Professor Jeffrie Murphy-who is today a skeptic of the harm
principle-captured well the prevailing consensus. "I believed,
along with most of the people with whom I talked about legal
78 Dworkin, supra note 34, at 1001 ("[The legislator] must sift these arguments and
positions, trying to determine which are prejudices or rationalizations, which presup-
pose general principles or theories vast parts of the population could not be sup-
posed to accept, and so on. It may be that when he has finished this process of
reflection he will find that the claim of a moral consensus has not been made out.").
For a discussion of Dworkin's argument, see Sartorius, supra note 60, at 893-98.
7' Dworkin, supra note 34, at 996. Dworkin sets forth in the second paragraph of
the essay the different positions available in response to Lord Devlin, and highlights
the harm principle:
Must there be some demonstration of present harm to particular persons directly af-
fected by the practice in question? ... [M]ust it also be demonstrated that these social
changes threaten long-term harm of some standard sort, like an increase in crime or a de-
crease in productivity?... If so, does the requirement of harm add much to the bare re-
quirement of public condemnation?
Id. at 986.
" Louis Henkin, Morals and The Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
391, 413 (1963).
8' Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 487 (1989).
82 George, supra note 51, at 30.
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philosophy," Murphy wrote, "that legal moralism had been
properly killed off, that liberalism had once again been vindi-
cated against the forces of superstition and oppression, and that
legal philosophy could now move on to new and more impor-
tant topics.
s83
This is not to suggest that the controversy simply disap-
peared from philosophic circles.8 4 There were attempts to re-
habilitate Devlin's position. s There were even attempts to
radicalize Devlin's argument. 6 And still today, Devlin has sup-
porters. In fact, just this year, Professor Gerald Dworkin pub-
lished a provocative essay entitled Devlin Was Right.8 7  In the
essay, Dworkin sides with Devlin "in believing that there is no
principled line following the contours of the distinction be-
tween immoral and harmful conduct such that only grounds re-
"Murphy, supra note 51, at 74-75.
84 Under one reading, the Hart-Devlin debate metamorphosed and resurfaced as
the liberal-communitarian debate, a much larger debate about liberalism and its abil-
ity to accommodate the need for community. This is most evident in Michael J. San-
del's article, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 521 (1989). In his article, Sandel argues that it is in fact impossible to bracket
controversial moral and religious convictions in debates over abortion and homo-
sexuality, and that the liberal attempt to do so results, at best, in a "thin and fragile
toleration." Id. at 537. But see Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 45 (1996) (arguing that "thinner" approaches to gay rights may be more ef-
fective in protecting gay rights in the constitutional law context). Sandel's discussion
develops many of the themes in the Hart-Devlin debate. Compare Sandel, supra, at
537-38, with Dworkin, supra note 13, at 946 ("I encourage liberals who wish to argue
against, for example, the criminalization of homosexual sex, to engage in the honest
toil of arguing that the reason such conduct ought not be criminalized is that there is
nothing immoral in it."). But Sandel carries the discussion into the larger context of
liberalism and its critics. Since the larger liberal-communitarian debate is beyond the
scope of this Article, I will not pursue here this strand of the Hart-Devlin debate.
" See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 51, at 76-78 (arguing that Devlin was right to chal-
lenge the inconsistency within liberalism between the harm principle and other lib-
eral doctrines like the retributive principle and the principle of fundamental rights
constitutionalism).
"Se e.g., George, supra note 51, at 30-37 (offering a communitarian re-inter-
pretation of Devlin that supposedly survives Hart's criticisms, according to which Dev-
lin's conception of social disintegration referred to interpersonal disintegration in
the community; and arguing, contra Devlin, for the more radical position that the
truth of a moral position is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of its legal en-
forcement). See also ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CrVIL LIBERTIES AND
PUBLIC MORALTY (1993).
" Dworkin, supra note 13.
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ferring to the latter may be invoked to justify criminalization."'
Dworkin argues that Devlin was right in criticizing the line be-
tween immoral and harmful conduct, and offers his own justifi-
cation for criminalizing immoral conduct-namely, that the
term "wrongful" connotes conduct that "ought not to be done"
in the very same way that the terms "harmful" or "offensive" do.
Nevertheless, even Gerald Dworkin's provocative essay does not
significantly alter the equation. To a certain extent, Dworkin's
argument in fact reflects the fragmentation on the conservative
side of the debate. In several key passages of his essay, Dworkin
seems to premise his argument on the assumption that harmless
wrongdoing is simply not possible. 9 If that is true, of course,
then his argument collapses into the public harm thesis-and
legal moralism is indistinguishable from the harm principle. In
any event, and more importantly for present purposes, Dworkin
is willing to concede in his essay that he is swimming against the
liberal tide. He readily acknowledges that he is practically alone
today in defending Lord Devlin.90 The fact is that, over time, a
consensus emerged that the liberal harm principle prevailed in
the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement of morality.
C. THE INFLUENCE ON LEGAL RHETORIC
As the harm principle began to dominate the legal philo-
sophic debate, the principle also began to dominate criminal
law scholarship and legal rhetoric. Most of the leading criminal
law scholars either adopted the harm principle or incorporated
it in their writings. Herbert Packer, in his famous book pub-
lished in 1968, entitled The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, in-
cluded the harm principle in his list of limiting criteria that
justified the criminal sanction. 91 Although Packer did not focus
8Id. at 928.
89 Dworkin intimates throughout his discussion of Feinberg's work that harmless
wrongdoing may not be possible. See, e.g., id. at 937 ("[The legal moralist is someone]
who wants to defend some kind of identification of harm and wrongdoing."); id. at
938 ("What we need are examples of types of acts which, while wrongful, do not (usu-
ally, tend to) set back interests. Whether it is possible for such acts to exist depends
upon one's views about the nature of morality.").
See id. at 92 7-28.
91 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION 296 (1968).
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primarily on the harm principle-focusing instead on the effec-
tiveness and social consequences of policing certain activities-
he did incorporate it into his work and argued that "[t]he harm
to others formula seems to me to have.., uses that justify its in-
clusion in a list of limiting criteria for invocation of the criminal
sanction.
9 2
The harm principle featured prominently in criminal law
treatises and casebooks. Most casebooks reproduced for law
students the Hart-Devlin debate. One of the most popular
casebooks, Professors Monrad Paulsen and Sanford Kadish's
first edition of Criminal Law and Its Processes, published in 1962,
started off on page one with the debate over Devlin's Mac-
cabaean lecture. It extracted a lengthy portion of the lecture, as
well as Hart's preliminary response published in the Listener.
93
Later editions of the popular casebook would excerpt Devlin's
lecture, describe Hart's response in Law, Liberty and Morality,
and refer the law student to Feinberg's four-volume treatise.,4
Professors Rollin Perkins and Ronald Boyce, in their treatise,
Criminal Law, emphasized that the genus of crime is harm.
Crime, they explained, is "any social harm defined and made
punishable by law."95 Professor Paul Robinson, in his popular
treatise, Criminal Law, refers first and foremost to societal harm
in discussing the definition of criminal conduct.9 6 Robinson
cites exclusively Joel Feinberg's treatise, The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law.
The simple harm principle also permeated the rhetoric of
the criminal law itself. This was reflected most clearly in the
drafting of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Insti-
tute, which was begun in 1952 and completed in 1962.97 Profes-
. Id. at 267.
MONRAD G. PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATIUS 1-17 (1st ed., 1962) (excerpting H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and
Treason, 62 LISTENER 162-63 (1959)).
9' SANFoRD H. KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASESAND MATERIALS 160-64 (6th ed. 1995).
SROLuN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 1982).
9 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw 131 (1997).
9' See Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model
Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1426 (1968). The Model Penal Code was a pro-
posed model of legislation drafted by the American Law Institute. It significantly in-
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sor Herbert Wechsler, the chief reporter and intellectual father
of the Model Penal Code, strongly endorsed harm as the guid-
ing principle of criminal liability. As early as 1955, Wechsler
wrote: "All would agree, I think, that there is no defensible
foundation for declaring conduct criminal unless it injures or
threatens to injure an important human interest... .,8 In his
scholarly writings, Wechsler consistently emphasized the harm
principle: conduct "is not deemed to be a proper subject of a
penal prohibition" unless it "unjustifiably and inexcusably in-
flicts or threatens substantial harm ... ."9 This was, Wechsler
emphasized, "a declaration designed to be given weight in the
interpretation of the [Model Penal] Code. '1°°
The language of the Model Penal Code reflected this em-
phasis on the harm principle. In the preliminary article, section
1.02, the drafters addressed the purposes of criminal law and
stated, as the very first principle, the objective "to forbid and
prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.''
l°0
In the Explanatory Note attached to the final draft, the drafters
referred to this harm principle as the "major goal" of the provi-
sions governing the definition of crimes-in contrast to the
other four stated purposes which are referred to as "subsidiary
themes.' ' 2 The Comment to the preliminary article refers to
the harm principle as "the dominant preventive purpose of the
penal law."10 3 It emphasizes that the harm principle "reflect[s]
inherent and important limitations on the just and prudent use
fluenced state legislation insofar as it was implemented or significantly influenced the
enactment of new criminal codes in approximately 34 states during the 1960s, '70s,
and '80s. See MODEL PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFr AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, at xi
(Complete Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of The
American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962) (1985).
" Herbert Wechsler, American Law Institute: II. A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law,
45J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & P.S. 524, 527 (1955).
'9 Wechsler, supra note 97, at 1432 (citation omitted).
100 Id.
"' See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985) Pt. I, Vol. I, § 1.02(1) (a).
112 See MODEL PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFr AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 97,
at Note 14.
'03 See id. at 16 (comment on preventing defined conduct).
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of penal sanctions as a measure of control., 10 4 Substantially simi-
lar provisions regarding the harm principle were enacted in
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington, among other states. 05
The harm principle was also reflected in the definition of
crimes, especially moral offenses and public decency crimes.
"The Model Penal Code does not attempt to enforce private
morality," the drafters explained. "Thus, none of the provisions
contained in Article 251 purports to regulate sexual behavior
generally."' °6 Professor Wechsler emphasized that:
Private sexual relations, whether heterosexual or homosexual, are
excluded from the scope of criminality, unless children are victimized or
there is coercion or other imposition. Penal sanctions also are with-
drawn from fornication and adultery, contrary to the law of many states.
Prostitution would continue to be penalized, primarily because of its re-
lationship to organized crime in the United States, but major sanctions
would be reserved for those who exploit prostitutes for their own 
gain.
With regard to each moral offense, the drafters specifically
discussed harm. In the case of prostitution, the drafters re-
tained the criminal sanction specifically because of the potential
harm in the spread of syphilis and gonorrhea. "Of special im-
portance to the continuation of penal repression," the drafters
emphasized, "was the perceived relationship between prostitu-
tion and venereal disease."'08 In the case of consensual homo-
sexual activity, the drafters rejected criminal responsibility on
the ground of lack of harm. The drafters canvassed the moral
grounds for sanctioning sodomy, but ultimately rejected them
,o' See id. at 17.
' See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-3(l) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.100(1) (1998); DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 11, § 201(1) (1995); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 775.012(1) (West 1992); GA.
CODEANN. § 26-102(1) (1998); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-102(1) (1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
2C:1-2(a) (1) (West 1998); N.Y. PENA LAW § 1.05(1) (McKinney 1998); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.025(1) (b) (1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 104(1) (West 1998); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 39-11-101(1) (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (West 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.04.020(1) (a) (West 1998). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL
DRAFTAND EXPLANATORYNOTEs, supra note 97, at 17 n.4.
'
0
6 MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND ExPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 97, at
196.
,U7 Wechsler, supra note 97, at 1449. See also Schwartz, supra note 37, at 673-74.
, ' MODEL PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTs, supra note 97, at
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because of the "absence of harm to the secular interests of the
community occasioned by atypical sexuality between consenting
adults."10 9 With regard to obscenity, the drafters paid special at-
tention to the relationship between obscene materials and overt
misbehavior. The drafters noted that "in another era, spiritual
error may have been a sufficient ground for penal repression,
but in an age of many faiths and none, society tends to look to
more objective criteria to determine what is harmful."110 Even
the proposed definition of public drunkenness incorporated
the harm (and offense) principles. In the Model Penal Code,
the offense of public intoxication "differs from prior law princi-
pally in requiring that the person be under the influence of al-
cohol or other drug 'to the degree that he may endanger
himself or other persons or property, or annoy persons in his vi-
cinity."",'
From philosophy of law to substantive criminal law, the
harm principle permeated the debate during the 1960s and
1970s. As evidenced by the writings of Professors Hart and
Feinberg in the legal philosophic debate, and of Professor
Wechsler and the drafters of the Model Penal Code in the sub-
stantive criminal law debate, the harm principle became the
dominant discursive principle used to draw the line between law
and morality. The decision to embrace Mill's original, simple
statement of the harm principle was a powerful rhetorical move.
Devlin's writings had fragmented the conservative position by
conflating harm and morality-by defining public morality in
terms of social harm-and had significantly ambiguated the
conception of harm at the heart of the debate. The liberal re-
sponse reclaimed the conception of harm. It simplified and
pared it back down to the mere idea of "harm." It bracketed
out the competing normative dimensions of harm. And it of-
fered a bright-line rule. A rule that was simple to apply. A rule
that was simply applied.
" Id. at 369. Though this was the principal reason advanced, the drafters re-
viewed a host of other reasons not to criminalize sodomy, including, inter alia, finite
resources, invasion of privacy, and arbitrary enforcement.
" Id. at 482.
.. Id. at 190.
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE LIBERALISM
During the course of the last two decades, the proponents
of legal enforcement have increasingly deployed the rhetoric of
harm. Armed with social science studies, with empirical data,
and with anecdotal evidence, the proponents of regulation and
prohibition have shed the 1960s rhetoric of legal moralism and
adopted, instead, the harm principle. Whether they have been
motivated by moral conviction or by sincere adherence to the
harm principle, the result is the same: the harm principle has
undergone an ideological shift-or, what Professor Balkin
would call "ideological drift"-from its progressive origins."'
Today, the harm principle is being used increasingly by
conservatives who justify laws against prostitution, pornography,
public drinking, drugs, and loitering, as well as regulation of
homosexual and heterosexual conduct, on the basis of harm to
others. The conservative harm arguments are powerful. By en-
dorsing the harm principle and simultaneously making harm
arguments, the proponents of legal enforcement have disarmed
the progressive position and the traditional progressive reliance
112 Many of the proponents of regulation and prohibition may have turned to
harm arguments purely for rhetorical purposes, and may continue to be motivated
entirely by moral principle. Dan M. Kahan's recent article, The Secret Ambition of Deter-
rence, would suggest that the real value of harm arguments-the secret ambition-is
precisely "to quiet illiberal conflict between contending cultural styles and moral out-
looks." 113 HARV. L. REv. 413, 415 (1999). For purposes of this Article, though, it
does not really matter what motivates the proponents of enforcement. What matters
is how their rhetoric has altered the structure of the debate over the legal enforce-
ment of morality.
.. It is interesting to note that there have also been attempts by progressives to
appropriate the legal moralist argument. Some progressive thinkers have argued for
the decriminalization of moral offenses, like prostitution or homosexual sodomy, on
moral grounds. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Reasons and the Limitation of Liberty,
40 WM. & MARYL. REv. 947, 949-57 (1989) ("[Tihe reason that homosexual conduct
ought not to be criminalized is that there is nothing immoral in such activity."); David
A.J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the De-
criminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1979) ('Judgments of the im-
morality of prostitution are... wrong, indeed, the right to engage in commercial sex
is one of the rights of the person which the state may not transgress."); Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1995)
("[P]ornography-at least gay male pomography-is to be valued as serving a social
good: [i] t enables its consumers to realize satisfying, nurturing sexual lives.").
BERNARD E. HARCOURT
on the harm principle. This has significantly changed the struc-
ture of the debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
In this Part, I will discuss a number of illustrations from a
variety of different contemporary debates. The purpose of
these illustrations is to show significant examples of the conser-
vative deployment of harm arguments-significant in the sense
that these particular arguments have been taken seriously in
contemporary debates. My purpose here is not to prove that
these conservative harm arguments have been accepted by eve-
ryone, nor even by a majority of the participants in the debates.
Nor is it my intention to prove that these conservative harm ar-
guments have resulted in a higher level of actual enforcement.
Again, larger social, political, cultural and historical factors may
also, and more significantly, influence the actual regulation or
prohibition of conduct. My focus in this Article is on changes in
justification, and these changes themselves may not necessarily
produce different enforcement. They do, however, have a sig-
nificant impact on the way we think, argue, and debate practices
like prostitution, drug use, drinking, and homosexuality, as well
as other conduct that has traditionally been viewed as morally
offensive.
A. PORNOGRAPHYAND HARM
In the mid-1980s, Professor Joel Feinberg discussed the
feminist critique of pornography and suggested that the proper
liberal position would be to leave open the possibility of regulat-
ing pornography if empirical evidence of harm developed.
Feinberg intimated that further empirical research regarding
some types of pornography might demonstrate harm. "In that
case," Feinberg wrote, "a liberal should have no hesitation in us-
ing the criminal law to prevent the harm."' 4 Feinberg cau-
tioned, however, that "in the meantime, the appropriate liberal
response should be a kind of uneasy skepticism about the harm-
ful effects of pornography on third-party victims, conjoined with
increasingly energetic use of 'further speech or expression'
against the cult of macho, 'effectively to combat the harm."' 5
"4 2 PFMNBERG, supra note 70, at 157.
"' Id See also 4 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at xv:
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Things are different today. The "appropriate liberal re-
sponse" to pornography today, I would suggest, is the free
speech argument-not the harm principle. 6 Proponents of the
regulation and prohibition of pornography have skillfully em-
ployed the harm argument in support of their own position,
and thereby undercut the earlier progressive response. Profes-
sor Catharine MacKinnon, perhaps more than anyone else, has
focused the debate on the harm to women caused by pornogra-
phy. MacKinnon's work has emphasized at least three types of
harm emanating from pornography. First, pornography inflicts
harm on the women who are used to make the pornographic
material.17 "It is for pornography," MacKinnon explains, "and
not by the ideas in it that women are hurt and penetrated, tied
and gagged, undressed and genitally spread and sprayed with
lacquer and water so sex pictures can be made."" 8 Second,
MacKinnon has argued, pornography harms the women who
are assaulted by consumers of pornography. Men who consume
pornography may be led-and in some cases are led-to com-
mit crimes of sexual violence against women. "It is not the ideas
in pornography that assault women," MacKinnon writes.
"[M] en do, men who are made, changed, and impelled by it."" 9
Third, pornography supports and promotes a general climate of
discrimination against women. It becomes a part of the identity
of women and of women's sexuality. "As the industry expands,"
MacKinnon explains, "this becomes more and more the generic
experience of sex, the woman in pornography becoming more
and more the lived archetype for women's sexuality in men's,
The two traditional legal categories involved in the harm-principle arguments are
defamation and incitement (to rape). I find the defamation argument ("Pornography
degrades women") defective. I treat the incitement argument with respect, leaving the
door open to criminal prohibitions of pornography legitimized on liberal (harm princi-
ple) grounds should better empirical evidence accumulate, while expressing skepticism
over simple causal explanations of male sexual violence.
Id.
"6 There is, of course, a complicated relationship between the First Amendment
and the harm principle. However, I will set aside detailed discussion of that relation-
ship since it is somewhat beyond the scope of this Article.
..See, e.g., MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 4, at 15 ("In pornography, women





hence women's, experience.' 20  Pornography, in sum, causes
multiple harms to women by shaping and distorting the modem
subject.
121
MacKinnon's arguments have infiltrated American legal
and political rhetoric. Though many resist MacKinnon's argu-
ment or the full implications of her argument, there is no ques-
tion that, today, pornography is associated with harm in a way
that it was not in the 1960s. Based at least in part on MacKin-
non's argument, several municipalities have begun to enforce
regulations aimed at decreasing the amount of pornography.
The city council of Indianapolis, for instance, implemented
MacKinnon's model ordinance.22 And in New York City, Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani has forcefully implemented a new zoning or-
dinance, passed in 1995, that is aimed at closing down commer-
cial sex establishments like strip clubs, sex shops and adult book
and video stores. Giuliani has justified the crack-down on the
harm that commercial sex poses to ordinary citizens and to
neighborhoods-not just in terms of increased crime against
women, but also in terms of reduced property values, tourism,
123and commerce.
MacKinnon's focus on harm also has influenced the re-
sponses of her main opponents-Judge Frank Easterbrook, who
struck down the Indianapolis ordinance in American Booksellers
1
2 0 id.
121 See id. at 37 (" [T] he evidence of the harm of such materials... shows that these
materials change attitudes and impel behaviors in ways that are unique in their extent
and devastating in their consequences. In human society, where no one does not
live, the physical response to pornography is nearly a universal conditioned male re-
action, whether they like or agree with what the materials say or not. There is a lot
wider variation in men's conscious attitudes toward pornography than there is in
their sexual responses to it.").
" See generally American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985). According to Judge Easterbrook, "A national commission in Canada recently
adopted a similar rationale for controlling pornography." Id. at 323 n.1 (citing
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, 1 PORNOGRAPHY AND
PROSTITUIION IN CANADA 49-59 (Canadian Government Publishing Centre 1985)).
'2 Justices OK X-Rated Shops Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999; Richard Perez-
Pena, City Too Zealous on X-Rated Shops, State Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at
Al; David Rohde, Supreme Court Denies Appeal by Sex Shops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at
B1. Giuliani'sjustification relies in large part on the "broken windows" theory which
is discussed infra Part III.B. See Giuliani, The Next Phase, supra note 3; see also Bratton,
supra note 3, at 785-88; Giuliani, 1999 State of the City Address, supra note 3.
[Vol. 90
1999] COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PRPNCIPLE
Association, Inc. v. Hudnut,12 4 and Professor Judith Butler, whose
recent book, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative,12 takes
issue with MacKinnon's approach.
Though Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, struck
down MacKinnon's ordinance on First Amendment grounds, he
nevertheless acknowledged the harm that pornography may
cause women.126 Easterbrook wrote in Hudnut
[W]e accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordina-
tion tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of
women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at
home, battery and rape on the streets. In the language of the legislature,
"[p1ornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of
discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and
subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. The big-
otry and contempt it produces, with the acts of aggression it fosters,
harm women's opportunities for equality and rights [of all kinds]."
127
Ironically, it is precisely the harm associated with pornogra-
phy that, according to Easterbrook, "simply demonstrates the
power of pornography as speech.'2 8 It is the harm of pornog
raphy that triggers First Amendment protection. Easterbrook
struck down the ordinance, not because pornography causes no
harm, but rather because the harm is evidence of the power of
speech and of the importance of protecting free speech. "If the
fact that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning were
124 Hudnut 771 F.2d at 323.
'2' BUTLER, supra note 9.
"' MacKinnon emphasizes this fact. SeeMACKINNON, ONLYWODS, supra note 4, at
92 ("[The court in Hudnut] began by recognizing that the harm pornography does is
real, conceding that the legislative finding of a causal link was judicially adequate ...
."1).
" Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (citing INDiANAPOLiS, IND., CODE § 16-1(a) (2) (1984)).
To be sure, in the margin, Easterbrook couched these observations as a judicial ac-
ceptance of legislative findings. "In saying that we accept the finding that pornogra-
phy as the ordinance defines it leads to unhappy consequences," Easterbrook noted,
"we mean only that there is evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent
with much human experience, and that as judges we must accept the legislative reso-
lution of such disputed empirical questions." Id. at 329 n.2. Nevertheless, his very
comment ("that this evidence is consistent with much human experience"), as well as
his lengthy discussion, in which he equates pornography with Nazism, communism,
and sedition, reflect his acceptance of MacKinnon's harm argument.
'2' Id. at 329.
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enough to permit governmental regulation, that would be the
end of freedom of speech."'
In the academy, Judith Butler has argued against MacKin-
non's proposal to regulate pornography. Butler is concerned
that regulation may give too much power to the state. The po-
tential risk, according to Butler, is that the state will then deploy
its regulatory power against the interests of minority groups.
Butler warns that "such strategies tend to enhance state regula-
tion over the issues in question, potentially empowering the
state to invoke such precedents against the very social move-
ments that pushed for their acceptance as legal doctrine. '' 0
She suggests that "this very extension of state power.., comes
to represent one of the greatest threats to the discursive opera-
tion of lesbian and gay politics.' 131 In the place of state regula-
tion, Butler advocates nonjuridical, nonregulatory forms of
resistance, like everyday forms of opposition and organized
group resistance. The paradigm of resistance, for Butler, is
the way in which the term of abuse "queer" was reappropriated
by gay men and lesbians and given new meaning through a pro-
cess of resignification. s
Throughout Butler's discussion, the concept of harm plays a
central role. Butler's argument attempts to refine MacKinnon's
discussion of harm in order to insert a gap between pornogra-
phy and its harm that would allow time and space for nonjuridi-
cal intervention. Butler's argument draws heavily on J.L.
Austin's early distinction in How to Do Things with Words between
illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. "Illocutionary"
describes speech acts that, in the very expression, produce ef-
fects. The conventional examples are the judge saying "I sen-
'2 Id. at 330.
'" BUTLER, supra note 9, at 24.
. Id. at 22.
2 Id. at 23.
' Id at 14 ("The revaluation of terms such as 'queer' suggest that speech can be
'returned' to its speaker in a different form, that it can be cited against its originary
purposes, and perform a reversal of effects. More generally, then, this suggests that
the changeable power of such terms marks a kind of discursive performativity that is
not a discrete series of speech acts, but a ritual chain of resignifications whose origin
and end remain unfixed and unfixable.").
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tence you" or the groom saying "I do." In each case, the speech
is simultaneously an act, a doing." "Perlocutionary" describes
speech acts that may trigger consequences, but do not do so at
the very moment of speaking. In perlocutionary acts there is a
temporal space between the saying and the consequences.
Butler argues that MacKinnon wrongly ascribes both per-
locutionary and illocutionary attributes to pornography. The
perlocutionary aspect corresponds to the incitement to rape;
the illocutionary to the demeaning of women and the shaping
of women's identity. Butler explains, "[i] n MacKinnon's recent
work, Only Words, pornography ... is understood not only to
'act on' women in injurious ways (a perlocutionary claim), but
to constitute, through representation, the class of women as an
inferior class (an illocutionary claim)."' 1 Butler suggests that
the illocutionary character is a new development, 13 6 and argues
that it has negative political implications. The problem, accord-
ing to Butler, is that if pornography is indeed illocutionary,
there is no room for resistance. The very possibility of resis-
tance, especially nonjuridical resistance, depends on there be-
ing some time and space between the speech act and the injury.
"The possibility for a speech act to resignify a prior context de-
pends, in part, upon the gap between the originating context or
intention by which an utterance is animated and the effects it
produces."37 Butler argues that pornography should not be in-
terpreted as having an illocutionary effect in order, precisely, to
allow for linguistic struggle.138
Butler's argument, then, underscores the perlocutionary
aspect of the harm to women. Harm drives Butler's conception of
individual agency and creates the need for a political struggle at
the individual level against harmful speech. Butler's use of lan-
guage demonstrates this well:
" Id. at 17.
"s Id. at 20-21.
"Id. at 18 ("Significantly, MacKinnon's argument against pornography has moved
from a conceptual reliance on a perlocutionary model to an illocutionary one.").
1S7 Id. at 14.
" Id. at 21 ("I will argue that, taken generically, the visual text of pornography




In the place of state-sponsored censorship, a social and cultural
struggle of language takes place in which agency is derived from injury,
and injuy countered through that very derivation.
Misappropriating the force of injurious language to counter its inju-
rious operations constitutes a strategy that resists the solution of state-
sponsored censorship, on the one hand, and the return to an impossible
notion of the sovereign freedom of the individual, on the other.
It is clear from this passage that harm is at the heart of the de-
bate. Butler's response both acknowledges harm and seeks to
refine the harm argument. At the political strategic level, ironi-
cally, Butler's proposal closely resembles Joel Feinberg's earlier
recommendation. Recall that Feinberg advocated "increasingly
energetic use of 'further speech or expression' against the cult
of macho, 'effectively to combat the harm."140 But, in contrast to
Feinberg, Butler does not adopt a stance of uneasy skepticism
concerning the harm to women. To the contrary, Butler's care-
ful analysis of the etiology of harm justifies her argument
against state regulation of pornography.
In the specific context of the pornography debate then,
MacKinnon's use of the harm argument has produced an ideo-
logical shift in the harm principle. In contrast to an earlier pe-
riod when the harm principle was employed by progressives to
justify limits on the regulation of pornography, the principle is
no longer an effective response to conservative proposals to
regulate. To the contrary, the conservatives have essentially
taken over the harm principle: harm has become the principal
argument for state intervention, as illustrated and, in this par-
ticular case, at least temporarily implemented, in Indianapolis
and New York City. Easterbrook and Butler's responses to
MacKinnon reflect how destabilizing this ideological shift has
been. These contemporary responses essentially discard the
harm principle in favor of free speech and strategic arguments
about political effectiveness. Most tellingly, these contemporary
responses incorporate harm into their own arguments to bolster
their position-in the case of free speech, to show the very
power of speech, and in the case of political strategy, to demon-
strate the need for political resistance, rather than state inter-
"'Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
140 2 FEINBERG, supra note 70, at 157.
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vention. The result is an entirely different structure in the de-
bate over the legal enforcement of morality: a structure of com-
peting harm claims with no internal mechanism to resolve
them.
B. PROSTITUTION AND HARM
Traditionally, prostitution presented a hard case for the
progressives. It implicated all three safe harbors in the harm
principle: consent, privacy, and supposedly self-regarding con-
duct. The private act of consensual, heterosexual fornication
was, after all, the paradigm activity protected by the harm prin-
ciple. What then distinguished a private act of consensual, het-
erosexual prostitution?
John Stuart Mill framed the question as follows: "Fornica-
tion, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but
should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling
house?' 41 Mill never really answered the question. "The case is
one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two
principles," Mill suggested, "and it is not at once apparent to
which of the two it properly belongs. 14 1 Mill rehearsed strong
arguments on both sides of the question. Consistency militated
in favor of toleration. On the other hand, pimps stimulate for-
nication for their own profit and society may elect to discourage
conduct that it regards as "bad.143 In the end, Mill refused to
take a position regarding the pimp. "I will not venture to de-
cide whether [the arguments] are sufficient to justify the moral
anomaly of punishing the accessory when the principal is (and
must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the pro-
curer, but not the fornicator .... ,,' With regard to the fornica-
tor, though, Mill clearly believed that no liability should attach.
In Law, Liberty, and Morality, H.L.A. Hart also straddled the
fence. As we saw earlier, Hart's lectures were a response to Lord
Devlin, and Devlin had argued that all aspects of prostitution
should be prohibited. Devlin had argued the flip side of Mill's
"' MILL, supra note 27, at 98.
142 rd




consistency thesis: if the law can prohibit brothel-keeping be-
cause it is exploitative, then surely the law could also regulate
prostitution. "All sexual immorality involves the exploitation of
human weaknesses," Devlin argued. "The prostitute exploits
the lust of her customers and the customer the moral weakness
of the prostitute.'4 5 In contrast to Devlin, but like Mill, Hart re
fused to resolve the issue explicitly. Instead, Hart reported on
the English Street Offences Act of 1959 and endorsed its under-
lying rationale. Under the Act, prostitution was not made ille-
gal, but solicitation in a street or public place was. According
to Hart, this approach respected the important distinctions be-
tween public and private, and between immorality and inde-
cency. Hart favored these distinctions, and, approvingly,
reported that "the recent English law relating to prostitution at-
tends to this difference. It has not made prostitution a crime
but punishes its public manifestation in order to protect the or-
dinary citizen, who is an unwilling witness of it in the streets,
from something offensive.' 4 7 For Hart, the offense principle
justified prohibiting the public manifestations of prostitution.
Prostitution itself, however, conducted in complete privacy,
could remain unregulated since it was not perceived as harmful.
Joel Feinberg adopted a similar approach in The Moral Lim-
its of the Criminal Law. Feinberg avoided reference to harm in
the context of prostitution, and suggested instead that an of-
fense principle could plausibly restrict overtly erotic behavior,
public acts of solicitation, and houses of prostitution.4 8  The
same offense principle, however, would not preclude private
sexual conduct including prostitution.4  Other contemporary
liberal writers similarly relied on the offense principle rather
than the harm principle. Herbert Packer, for instance, wrote:
It seems that prostitution, like obscenity and like other sexual of-
fenses, should be viewed as a nuisance offense whose gravamen is not the
act itself, or even the accompanying commercial transaction, but rather
" DEVuN, supra note 36, at 12.
"' HART, supra note 40, at 11.
147 Id. at 45.
182 'EINBERG, supra note 70, at 43.
149 Id. at 46 (Feinberg qualifies his statement about not restricting private prostitu-
tion with the phrase: "except for rules regulating commerce").
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its status as a public indecency. That is the approach taken in England,
where law enforcement does not seem to be plagued with the self-
imposed problems that our prostitution controls engender.' 5°
In sharp contrast, the last two decades have witnessed a dis-
tinct shift in the debate over prostitution. The proponents of
regulation or prohibition, instead of arguing about morality or
offense, have turned to the harm argument, and thereby dis-
armed the traditional progressive position. This shift is the re-
sult again, at least in part, of Catharine MacKinnon's writings.
MacKinnon has argued that prostitution is on par with rape,
battery, sexual harassment, and pornography in its harm to
women.'5' The impact of MacKinnon's work has been to focus
on the harm to the women who engage in commercial sex and
to women's identity more generally. What also has transformed
the debate over prostitution is the "broken windows" theory of
crime prevention, first articulated in James Q. Wilson and
George L. Kelling's article, Broken Windows, in the Atlantic
Monthly in 1982. I have described and analyzed the broken
windows theory in extensive detail in my recent article Reflecting
on the Subject.5 3 For present purposes, what is important is that,
under the broken windows argument, the potential harm to so-
ciety in prostitution is not so much the harm to women, but
rather the likelihood of increased serious criminal activity. The
broken windows hypothesis provides that, if prostitution and
other minor disorderly conduct in a neighborhood go unat-
tended, serious crime will increase in that neighborhood. Dis-
order, such as prostitution, brings about increased criminal
' 
0 PACKER, supra note 91, at 331.
15, See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 138
(1989). To be sure, prostitution had been a target of the feminist movement since
the nineteenth century. At that time, however, many "feminists believed that prosti-
tutes had a right to perform their work free from police harassment." Eleanor M.
Miller, The United States, in PROSTrUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON TRENDS,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 300, 302 (Nanette J. Davis ed., 1993). Although many femi-
nists in the nineteenth century perceived prostitution as causing harm to the prosti-
tutes, they nevertheless militated for legalization. Id.
112 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29.
"' Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Con-
ception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MIcH. L. R v. 291 (1998).
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activity. According to the broken windows argument, prostitu-
tion causes harm to society by causing more violent crimes.
The broken windows hypothesis focuses on a range of mi-
nor disorderly conduct of both a social (prostitution, public in-
toxication, aggressive panhandling, and loitering) and physical
nature (littering, abandoned buildings, and broken windows).
Of special relevance here, the theory highlights the role of pros-
titution as part of the disorder. Prostitutes are among the dis-
orderly-they are among "the disreputable or obstreperous or
unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy
teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed."'" 4 And
prostitution plays a central role in the process whereby disorder
causes serious crime:
[A disorderly] area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not
inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people
are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls,
drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped.
That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prosti-
tutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps vio-
lently. That muggings will occur.155
As this passage makes clear, prostitution is central to the causal
chain connecting disorder and crime in the broken windows
hypothesis. "56
" Wilson & Kelling, supra note 152, at 30 (emphasis added).
,-'Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
Surprisingly, there is actually a lack of empirical evidence. The only social sci-
entific study on point found that prostitution and commercial sex activities were not
correlated with the other indices of disorder and were not significantly related to ma-
jor crimes. The author of the study, Wesley G. Skogan, ultimately excluded prostitu-
tion and commercial sex activities from his index of disorder precisely because they
were not related to other aspects of social or physical disorder. WESLEY G. SKOGAN,
DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPiRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS
(1990). Skogan wrote:
At the individual level, reactions to these problems [prostitution and smut] formed a
separate factor in every area in which they were included. A separate index of the extent
of commercial sex problems was formed, but-as the status of the items as a separate factor
hints-it was correlated only +.18 with the summary disorder measure and was not related
to other neighborhood factors in the same fashion as either social or physical disorder....
As a result, this cluster of (very interesting) problems will not be considered in any detail in
this report.
WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND COMMUNITY DECLINE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE 19 (1987) (emphasis added). Using Skogan's data
and replicating his study, I found that the correlation between prostitution and rob-
bery victimization is in fact -.10 and that there is no statistically significant relation-
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The conception of harm at the heart of the Broken Windows
essay-in conjunction with MacKinnon's harm argument-has
significantly altered the structure of the debate over the en-
forcement of laws against prostitution. The contemporary pro-
ponents of regulation or prohibition have changed the
equation of harm, undercut the earlier progressive argument,
and neutralized the harm principle: the principle is no longer
an effective argument because it is silent once a threshold of
harm has been met. The conservative claims of harm have, in
essence, disarmed the 1960s progressive position.
157
In this particular context, it is interesting to note that the
shift in justification has coincided with heightened enforcement
of domestic laws against prostitution. This is not to suggest a
causal relationship-again, factors other than justification play a
significant role in law enforcement-but to underscore an in-
teresting coincidence. In the past ten to twenty years, there has
been an increase in the enforcement of laws against prostitution
from an earlier period of effective decriminalization. Professor
Bill Nelson has chronicled the changes in the laws dealing with
prostitution in New York State from 1920 to 1980, and has high-
lighted the trend toward decriminalization that occurred after
World War II.
According to Nelson, the earlier period-1920 to 1940-was
characterized by "intense criminal regulation"'158 of prostitution
and 'judicial enforcement of Victorian sexual norms."159 During
that earlier period, "mostjudges... adopted a tough stance to-
ward prostitution 1'6 and justified their actions based on their
ship between prostitution and robber, victimization (p-value of .712). See Harcourt,
supra note 153, at 319 n.116.
,17 Another factor that may have contributed to the harm argument is the AIDS
epidemic, discussed more fully supra Part III.D. In relation to the enforcement of
laws against prostitution, see, for example, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, RECOMMENDATION 9-51, at 131
(June 1988) ("Prostitution laws should be strictly enforced.") (quoted in AIDS LAW
AND PoLIcY 249 (Arthur Leonard et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995)).
' William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980, 5 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 275-76 (1993).




concern to preserve "high moral standards.' '16 ' The trend to-
ward decriminalization of prostitution in New York State began
in the mid-1940s, took hold in the 1950s, and continued
through 1980. During this period, "[b]y construing legislation
narrowly and holding evidence of guilt insufficient to sustain
convictions, a majority of judges, in effect, pursued a policy of
decriminalization.' 62  Nelson's review of the legal arguments
employed during this period reveals heavy reliance on the harm
principle. One family courtjudge, for instance, went so far as to
state that "[h] owever offensive it may be, recreational commer-
cial sex threatens no harm to the public health, safety or wel-
fare," and should "not be proscribed."
163
Nelson suggests that, during the late 1970s, "a new, radical
feminist opposition to prostitution began to emerge as the main
force behind the expansion of the criminal law."'1 4 Nelson is re-
ferring here to the social movement that deployed the feminist
harm arguments discussed earlier. As Nelson explains, "the new
radical feminists focused on prostitution not as an evil to society
in general but as a harm to women in particular; in the radical
view, it was the prostitutes themselves who were victimized and
exploited and needed to be protected."' According to Nelson,
however, this social movement was effectively countered by the
proponents of decriminalization-including "liberal femi-
nists"16--and, as a result, decriminalization continued to mark
the period ending in 1980.
Since 1980, however, laws criminalizing prostitution have
been more vigorously enforced. In New York City, the police
have targeted prostitution-and other minor misdemeanor of-
fenses-under a new policing strategy known as the quality-of-
161 Id. at 277.
162 Id. at 288.
'6 Id. at 288 (quoting In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 468 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1977), rev'd,
418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)).
'64 Id. at 333.
"5 Id. at 333. I should emphasize here, again, that I am not arguing-perhaps in
contrast to Nelson-that legal and political arguments cause or produce actual change
in the enforcement of laws against prostitution. My purpose in describing the history
of enforcement is to observe the coincidence between changing justifications and ac-
tual enforcement.
,66 Id. at 268.
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life initiative. Premised on the Broken Windows essay, the new
policing initiative seeks to create public order by aggressively
enforcing laws against prostitution, as well as public drunken-
ness, loitering, vandalism, littering, public urination, aggressive
panhandling, and other minor misdemeanors. 16 7 With regard to
prostitution, "the city's police crackdown on streetwalking be-
gan in 1994, when more than 9,500 prostitutes and clients were
arrested. Clients found their names being published and vehi-
cles taken away, while judges proved less likely to allow prosti-
tutes back on the street without jail sentences."' '  The
crackdown has had a significant impact on the public manifesta-
tions of prostitution. "Experts say the crackdown has cut the
number of streetwalkers in half in some parts of the city, and
repeat offenders are fewer.'
69
At the national level, the overall regulation of female
streetwalkers has also increased in recent years. According to
experts, "attempts to control the prostitute herself by law have
increased in the United States, while, at the same time, they
have waned in Europe.' 70 In addition,
[c] ommunities across the nation have ... enact[ed] loitering ordinances
based upon the one used in Seattle, Washington. Such ordinances gen-
erally allow the authorities to arrest either "any person" or "any person
known" to be a member of a category of persons (e.g., prostitutes,
'67 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and former New York City Police Commissioner Wil-
liam Bratton, the principal architects of the quality-of-life initiative, cite the Broken
Windows article as the main source of their ideas. See Kevin Cullen, The Comish,
BOSTON GLOBE SUNDAY MAGAZINE, May 25, 1997, at 12; Fred Kaplan, Looks Count,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1997, at El. See also William J. Bratton, The New York City Po-
lice Department's Civil Enforcement of Qualiof-Life Crimes, 3J.L. & POL'Y 447 (1995); Gi-
uliani, The Next Phase, supra note 3.
'6' Kit R. Roane, Prostitutes on Wane in New York Streets But Take to Internet, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1998, at Al.
"' Id. According to experts, though, prostitution is no less present in the city. It
has simply moved from the public streets to the Internet and pagers. These venues
are far more difficult for the police to penetrate because prostitutes who work on-line
or through escort services are better able to detect undercover police officers. As a
result, the New York Police Department only succeeded in closing down 30 on-line
and escort service establishments during the first eight months of 1997, and only 44
such establishments for all of 1996. Id.
170 Miller, supra note 151, at 318.
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pimps) if they regIeatedly attempt to engage passersby in conversation or
beckon to them.
In the case of prostitution, then, the proliferation of con-
servative harm arguments-arguments about the harm to
women, to crime victims, to neighborhoods and property
value-has coincided with heightened enforcement of laws
against prostitution. The enforcement measures have had a
significant effect, particularly on the perception of orderliness
in many cities. The transformation of Forty-Second Street and
Times Square in New York City, for instance, has made a far-
reaching impression across the nation. It has signaled the tre-
mendous financial costs, in terms of lost tourism and com-
merce, that commercial sex establishments impose on a
neighborhood. Undoubtedly, this has reinforced the rhetorical
strength of the conservative harm arguments against prostitu-
tion.
C. DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND HARM
The broken windows theory also significantly altered the
debate in the area of disorderly conduct more generally. The
Broken Windows essay, which appeared in 1982, revolutionized
the way police departments and policy-makers think about mi-
nor misdemeanor offenses, like loitering, panhandling, public
urination, graffiti spraying, illegal peddling, turnstile jumping,
and other "quality-of-life" offenses. As Professor Debra Living-
ston observes, the essay has been:
"widely cited," has become "one of the most influential articles on polic-
ing," and has helped to create what some have termed a "consensus" in
community and problem-oriented policing circles that the neglect of
... Id. at 318-19. Such statutes have been enacted, for instance, in Alabama (ALA.
CODE § 13A-11-9 (1994)), Arizona (AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-2905 (West 1989)), Ar-
kansas (Amx. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (Michie 1997)), California (CAL. PENAL CODE §
647 (West 1999)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-112 1998)), Hawaii (HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 712-1206 (1994)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-5613 (1997)), Kentucky (KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.090 (Michie 1990)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.725
(West 1987)), New Jersey (NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1 (West 1995)), New York (N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 1998)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204
(1993)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24 (West 1999)), Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-34-8 (1994)), and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (1996)).
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quality-of-life problems was a deficiency of urban policing in the period
into the 1980s.72
What the broken windows theory accomplished was to trans-
form these quality-of-life offenses from mere nuisances or an-
noyances into positively harmful conduct-conduct that in fact
contributes to serious crimes, like murder and armed robbery.
Now, to be sure, many of these quality-of-life offenses easily satis-
fied the harm principle. Graffiti spraying and public urination
cause property damage, and therefore harm. Similarly, turnstile
jumping represents lost income. In other words, many of these
minor offenses could be regulated consistently with the harm
principle. What I would like to focus on, however, are the type
of quality-of-life offenses that were not previously viewed as per se
harmful. A good illustration is loitering.
The debate over anti-loitering ordinances has significantly
changed during the past thirty years, from a debate that focused
on loitering as a public nuisance to a debate that is focusing in-
creasingly on loitering as a generalized harm. This is reflected
well in the litigation over anti-loitering statutes, the legal chal-
lenges under the vagueness and free speech provisions, and the
various courts' treatment of these challenges. Debra Livingston
has reviewed in detail the historical development and legal
transformation of the courts' treatment of anti-loitering laws,
73
and I will not repeat the history here. I will focus instead on the
changes that illustrate the conservative turn to harm.
In the 1960s and 1970s, loitering was viewed primarily as an
annoyance. The history of vagrancy laws, and especially their
origin in early English laws regulating the labor force, is well
known 4 For present purposes, what is important is that, in the
'7 Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 584 (1997); see also Har-
court, supra note 153, at 292-95.
,'" See Livingston, supra note 172, at 595-627; see alsoAlfred Hill, Vagueness and Police
Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1289 (1999).
" See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 157-59 (1972);
Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd,
999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 101,
§ 250.6, cmt 1; Jeffrey S. Adler, A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 27
CIMINOLOGY 209 (1989); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
1999]
BERNARD E. HARCOURT
'60s and '70s, prior to the broken windows hypothesis, anti-
loitering statutes were most often justified on the grounds of
preventing annoyance to the public and idleness among the
able-bodied. Many of the anti-loitering ordinances specifically
referred to idleness and annoyance in proscribing conduct.
The ordinance that the Supreme Court struck down in Coates v.
City of Cincinnati in 1971, for instance, made it a criminal of-
fense for a group of persons to "conduct themselves in a man-
ner annoying to persons passing by."'7 The ordinance that the
Court struck down in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville in 1972
criminalized, among other things, "habitual loafers," "persons
able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children," and "persons neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served."176 As the comment to the Model
Penal Code explains, anti-loitering ordinances most commonly
proscribed "living in idleness without employment and having
no visible means of support., 17 7 To be sure, anti-loitering laws
were used by the police to investigate crime, to create order in
neighborhoods and, in many cases, to oppress minorities. But
the typical justification offered for the statutes was to cut down
on a public nuisance. Even the 1960s reforms-the new ordi-
nances and the legal doctrinal transformations-continued to
treat these quality-of-life offenses as annoyances. The Model
Penal Code revision of the crime of "disorderly conduct," for in-
stance, was specifically drafted, according to its authors, to "pe-
nalize public nuisance.' '178 The drafters required, as the mental
state, that the offender have the "purpose to cause public in-
convenience, annoyance or alarm."'79
An important and influential legal doctrine that was used
repeatedly in the '60s and '70s-and continues to be used to-
day-was that "a statute which fails to distinguish between inno-
-' Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971) (emphasis added).
76 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 n.1.
7 MODELPENAL CODE, supra note 101, § 250.6, cmt. 1.
'
78 Id. § 250.2, cmt 2.
179 id.
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cent conduct and action which is calculated to cause harm may
not be sustained." 8' The distinction between innocent loitering
and harmful loitering reflected the idea that not all loitering was
harmful. Harmful loitering involved someone casing a store, or
soliciting prostitution, or offering to sell drugs. Innocent loiter-
ing, in contrast, involved merely hanging around without any
criminal intent. Courts generally required-and often still do
today' 81-that statutes distinguish between these two types of
conduct, and only criminalize harmful loitering. The typical
justification was that "an ordinance which makes no distinction
between conduct calculated to harm and conduct which is es-
sentially innocent is an unreasonable exercise of the govern-
ment's police power." 82 Similarly, many jurisdiction adopted
anti-loitering laws that specifically targeted illegal conduct, like
soliciting prostitution, or gambling, or the sale of illegal drugs.'83
These new statutes proscribed harmful loitering. This distinc-
tion was similarly incorporated into the Model Penal Code's
definition of disorderly conduct, which, according to the draft-
ers, "prohibits only conduct that is itself disorderly and does not
punish lawful behavior that prompts others to respond in a dis-
orderly manner.',
8 4
The broken windows theory of harm-the notion that all
loitering may cause harm to a neighborhood by creating an at-
mosphere of disorder that renders the neighborhood vulner-
able to crime-was not prevalent in the debate in the '60s and
'70s. The few references to such an idea were generally dis-
missed summarily. In Papachristou, for instance, Justice Douglas
rejected a broken windows-type argument out of hand. Douglas
remarked, writing for a unanimous Court:
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll
or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their
wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals
See, e.g., People v. Pagnotta, 253 N.E.2d 202, 205 (N.Y. 1969).
,8, For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on this doctrine in its opinion
recently holding Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60-61 (Il1. 1997), affd, 119 S. Ct. 1849
(1999).
182 City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Wash. 1990).
'"' See MODELPENAL CODE, supra note 101, § 250.6, cmt4.
'"' See id. § 250.
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is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these
generalized vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped in the bud-
is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. 18
Things changed, however, with the Broken Windows essay.
Increasingly today, municipalities are offering evidence of the
broken windows argument to support loitering and curfew or-
dinances. The most telling cases involve litigation arising in
New York City, where the city specifically introduced "broken
windows" evidence of the harm caused by loitering.'86 Loper v.
New York City Police Department involved a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a New York State loitering statute which prohibited
anyone from "loiter[ing], remain[ing] or wander[ing] about in
a public place for the purpose of begging.''8 7 At the trial court,
the city presented the expert testimony of George Kelling, co-
author of the Broken Windows essay, to provide evidence of the
broken windows theory and the harm that loitering causes." As
the trial court explained:
Professor Kelling has testified without contradiction that beggars
and panhandlers indicate to society that disorder has set in. A neigh-
borhood with such people, in which there are broken windows, drug
dealers, and youth gangs, is threatening to the society precisely because
of the indication of disorder.... Though he tends to lump peaceful and
aggressive begging together ... the thrust of his testimony is that the po-
lice, by enforcing the Statute, seek to reassert an orderly society. Realty
[sic] and everyday experience confirm this "Broken Windows" effect.'8
Based on this evidence, the city argued that the loitering
ordinance was 'Justified due to the 'Broken Windows' message
beggars convey."'9 Three years earlier, in Young v. New York City
Transit Authority, a case challenging the prohibition against beg-
ging in the New York City subways, the city had similarly pre-
"' Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Farber v. Rochford,
407 F. Supp. 529, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
"' Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (up-
holding law prohibiting begging in the subway); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't.,
802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (strik-
ing down anti-loitering statute). See generally Peter A. Barta, Note, Giuliani, Broken
Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 GEo.J. PovER-YL. & PoL'Y 165 (1999).
,17 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1032.
1'8 See id. at 1034-35, 1046.
Id. at 1034-35.
", Id. at 1040.
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sented expert evidence from Kelling concerning the broken
windows theory.19'
Other municipalities similarly have been presenting evi-
dence of harm. In litigation over the San Diego youth curfew,
the city of San Diego introduced evidence, including "national
and local statistics," to support the claim that a juvenile curfew
would "reduce juvenile crime and victimization." 92 The evi-
dence presented included a Department ofJustice report onju-
venile offenders and victims, showing rising juvenile crime rates
in the country, and a local police department report that pur-
portedly revealed a drop in victimization during curfew hours
while the curfew was enforced.
9 3
In the Supreme Court litigation concerning the anti-gang
loitering ordinance in Chicago, City of Chicago v. Morales, as well
as in academic debate, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey
Meares have presented evidence that enforcement of the anti-
loitering ordinance has resulted in significant declines in gang-
related violence. 94 Their contention is premised on the broken
"" Young, 903 F.2d at 149-50.
"2 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997) (ultimately hold-
ing the curfew ordinance unconstitutional).
, ' Id. at 947.
194 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 24, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121),
available in LEXIS, Supreme Court Cases and Materials Library, U.S. Supreme Court
Briefs File ("Law-enforcement officials in Chicago, for example, report dramatic re-
ductions in violent offenses in the neighborhoods where the Ordinance has been
most vigorously enforced."); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oJ)
Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'y REv. 805, 822 (1998) ("Law enforcement offi-
cials in Chicago, for example, report dramatic reductions in violent offenses in
neighborhoods in which that city's gang-loitering ordinance is most vigorously en-
forced.... Numerous other municipalities report the effectiveness of curfews in re-
ducing the incidence ofjuvenile victimization and juvenile crime."); see also Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and DrugLaw Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 224-25
(1998). Their argument has generated significant debate in academic circles, and
their empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the ordinance has been challenged.
See Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn":" Implications for Research Design
and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2000) (on file with author); Dorothy E. Roberts Foreword: Race, Vague-
ness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89J. CiuM. L. & CRI INOLOGY
775, 794-95 (1999); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Albert W. Alschuler, Getting the Facts
Straight: Crime Trends, Community Support, and the Police Enforcement of "Social Norms", 34
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windows theory that gang-loitering causes serious crime. Their
amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court contains the following
long-list of harms caused by gang-loitering. To place this list of
harms in perspective, recall that the ordinance prohibited any
person from loitering ("remaining in any one place with no ap-
parent purpose") with one or more other persons whenever the
police reasonably believed that any one of those persons was a
criminal street-gang member.95
Gang criminality has made the inner-city neighborhoods of Chicago
deadly places to live. Stories of innocent bystanders shot in gang-war
crossfire have become staples of newspaper headlines and TV news in
Chicago as elsewhere.... Street-level intimidation is one of the primary
strategies by which gangs extend their influence. By stationing small
groups of gang members on the streets, gangs stake out and lay claim to
turf, sell drugs to finance the procurement of arms, recruit new mem-
bers (often coercively), serve as lookouts and intelligence gatherers, and
intimidate neighborhood residents and passers-by. Intimidation takes
many forms.... Law-abiding citizens are effectively imprisoned in their
homes as a result of the mere presence of gang members on the streets..
.Children are particularly vulnerable to the intimidation of gang mem-
bers congregating on the streets. Fear is the primary tool of gang re-
cruitment .... Inner-city residents in Chicago and elsewhere are, in a
very real sense, engaged in a battle to protect themselves from a deadly
urban disease that victimizes both gang members and non-gang mem-
bers. Their formidable challenge is to find a cure that does not itself
threaten the well-being of their communities and children.'96
To be sure, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of the
Court, rejected the city of Chicago's argument that the ordi-
nance has been effective, stating that "[g]iven the myriad factors
that influence levels of violence, it is difficult to evaluate the
probative value of this statistical evidence, or to reach any firm
conclusion about the ordinance's efficacy.', 97 However, what
matters is not whether the broken windows harm argument pre-
vails in the litigation. It did not prevail in Morales, Loper, or Nu-
nez-although it did in Young. What matters is that the
proponents of regulation have turned increasingly to harm ar-
LAw & Soc'Y REv. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author); see generally Toni Mas-
saro, The Gang's Not Here, 2THE GREEN BAG 25 (1998).
"-'City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 n.2 (1999).
'9 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 194, at 19-21.
"' Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855 n.7.
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guments and that these harm arguments have begun to shape
the current debates on anti-loitering statutes. 98
D. HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND HARM
The case of homosexual conduct is particularly interesting
because here, it seemed, legal moralism was still strong. In
1986, the United States Supreme Court adopted legal moralism
for purposes of rational basis review under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,'9 Justice White, writing for the Court, specifically said
that moral sentiments provided a rational basis for enforcing
Georgia's criminal ban on homosexual sodomy. In other words,
morality alone justified limiting the liberty of homosexuals.200 In
the case of the debate over the enforcement of laws regulating
homosexuality, then, it appeared that legal moralism remained
strong and that, as a result, there was no real need for the pro-
"' What is equally remarkable is that, perhaps for the first time, the broken win-
dows theory has made it into a Supreme Court decision. In his concluding paragraph
of his lengthy dissentJustice Scalia writes:
[AIll sorts of perfectly harmless activity by millions of perfectly innocent people can be
forbidden-riding a motorcycle without a safety helmet, for example, starting a campfire
in a national forest, or selling a safe and effective drug not yet approved by the FDA. All of
these acts are entirely innocent and harmless in themselves, but because of the risk of harm
that day entai, the freedom to engage in them has been abridged. The citizens of Chicago
have decided that depriving themselves of the freedom to "hang out" with a gang member
is necessary to eliminate pervasive gang crime and intimidation-and that the elimination
of the one is worth the deprivation of the other. This Court has no business second-
guessing either the degree of necessity or the fairness of the trade.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1879 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis partially added). Justice
Scalia is, in effect, referring here to the broken windows argument-that although
loitering may be innocent, innocent loitering may nevertheless entail a risk of harm.
t99 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
"" For discussion of this point in relation to the Hart-Devlin debate, see Anne B.
Golstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determi-
nants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073 (1988); Greenawalt, supra note 27, at
724; Murphy, supra note 113, at 947. See generally, Symposium, Law, Community, and
Moral Reasoning, 77 CAL. L. REV. 475-594 (1989) (discussing the debate over the en-
forcement of morality in light of Bowers). For a discussion of the constitutional stan-
dard of rational basis review in relation to the enforcement of morals, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGEJR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 161-73 (1999); D.
Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REv. 67 (1993).
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ponents of regulation to turn to harm arguments tojustify regu-
lation or prohibition.'
The tragic advent of the AIDS epidemic, however, changed
things. The threat of AIDS became the harm that justified in-
creased regulation. So much so, in fact, that today harm argu-
ments appear to play at least an equal role with legal moralist
arguments in the debate over the regulation of homosexual
conduct.
This is not to suggest that prior to the AIDS epidemic, harm
played no role in regulating homosexuality; it certainly did,"2
0' To be sure, legal moralist arguments have not always trumped harm principle
arguments. In several important cases, the harm principle has been used to protect
the interests of gay men and lesbians. For instance, in the Hawai'i case of Baehr v.
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d.
1234 (Haw. 1997), subsequently rev'd, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. Dec. 9,
1999), in striking down a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage, the trial court relied
heavily on the harm principle. The court ruled that there was no "causal link be-
tween allowing same-sex marriage and adverse effects upon the optimal development
of children." Id. at *18. Similarly, in the Georgia case of Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18,
24-26 (Ga. 1998), in striking down the state anti-sodomy law, the state supreme court
also relied on lack of harm, and it rejected legal moralism. The court concluded that
"[w]hile many believe that acts of sodomy, even those involving consenting adults, are
morally reprehensible, this repugnance alone does not create a compelling justifica-
tion for state regulation of the activity." Id- at 26. More importantly, in the more re-
cent decision of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the United States Supreme
Court took a different approach than it had in Hardwick. In Evans, the Court can be
interpreted as having relied on a harm principle; and it is possible-in fact, prob-
able-that the logic of Evans will eventually prevail over the reasoning of Hardwick.
See Toni M. Massaro, History Unbecoming Becoming History, 98 MICH. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2000) (on file with author).
But the legal moralism argument has been accepted in Hardwick, and thus, within
the framework of this Article, it is fair to say that legal moralism still appeared to be a
viable argument in the late 1980s. In contrast to the other categories of conduct dis-
cussed previously, the legal moralism argument had not been disabled by the harm
principle in the debate over the legal regulation of homosexual conduct. One very
important point here, though, is that we should not confuse legal and political theo-
retic discussion with actual litigation strategy. As my colleague Toni Massaro demon-
strates in an important forthcoming essay, History Unbecoming Becoming History, supra,
lawyers are probably better off invoking less rather than more political theorizing in
the courtroom, and focusing on extensive fact-finding and documentation of the
concrete harms and adverse consequences of antigay measures. As Massaro argues,
correctly I believe, "advocates of gay equality.., should avoid ornate political theoriz-
ing or post-liberal, legal theories, and rivet the judicial gaze on the antigay policy in
question-what it really is, what it really does, whom it really hurts, and what it really
costs." Id.
1999] COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PRTNCIPLE
and continues to. 20°  Nor is this to suggest that AIDS has only
played a role in the regulation of homosexuality. HIL-infected
persons have been convicted of a variety of crimes for exposing
others to the virus, in sexual and non-sexual, heterosexual and
homosexual, and civilian and military contexts.0 4 The point
2"2 For instance, in many jurisdictions, a nonviolent homosexual advance amoun-
ted to harm sufficient to give rise to a heat of passion defense to murder. See generally
Joshua Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provoca-
tion Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995); Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter:
The Homosexual Advance As Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992).
2:1 Other harms-other than the harm associated with AIDS--continue to be used
tojustify regulating homosexuality. For instance, in several cases, courts have denied
a parent custody of their child because they have admitted, or are involved in, a ho-
mosexual relationship. The harm here is the purported harm to the development of
the child. See, e.g., Ex parteJ.M.F, 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (stating that "a
child raised by two women or two men is deprived of extremely valuable developmen-
tal experience and the opportunity for optimal... development"); In re Marriage of
Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that children required on-
going counseling as a result of their mother's acknowledgment of her lesbianism);
Knotts v. Knotts, 693 N.E.2d 962, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that mother's
homosexual relationship "impacted negatively upon her oldest child" who was "diag-
nosed with major depression and prescribed Prozac, based at least in part upon her
mother's relationship with another woman"); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La.
Ct. App. 1995) (writing that "lilt is the opinion of this court that under such facts,
primary custody with the homosexual parent would rarely be held to be in the best
interests of the child"); see generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 200, at 13941; Elizabeth
Trainor, Custodial Parent's Homosexual or Lesbian Relationship with Third Person as Justify-
ing Modification of Child Custody Order, 65 ALR~th 591 (1999). The controversy over
same-sex marriage and child custody has recently generated more heated debate
about the purported harm to children of homosexual parenting. Compare Lynn D.
Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
833, 897 (1997) (arguing that the research cited in most law reviews "is unreliable"
and "colored significantly by bias in favor of homosexual parenting," and that, in con-
trast, "some of the research suggests that there are some serious potential harms to
children raised by homosexual parents"), with Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea,
Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REv. 253, 338 (1998) (arguing that Wardles' list of potential harms "once subjected to
scrutiny, quickly disintegrates into unwarranted assumptions and questionable con-
clusions").
2'4 HIV-infected persons have been convicted of reckless endangerment, attemp-
ted murder, and aggravated assault with intent to murder for biting or attempting to
bite corrections or police officers. See, e.g., Burk v. State, 478 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996) (upholding conviction for reckless endangerment for attempting to bite cor-
rections officer); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding at-
tempted murder conviction where defendant bit and spread blood from his own
wounds on police officer and paramedic); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. App. Div.
1993) (upholding conviction for attempted murder where HIV-infected prisoner bit
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here is simply that the AIDS epidemic has also been used in the
debate over homosexual conduct as a harm to justify regulation.
This became immediately apparent in the debate over the
closing of gay bathhouses at the time of the outbreak of the
AIDS epidemic. The issue of closing gay bathhouses-and
thereby regulating homosexual activity-first arose in San Fran-
cisco in 1984. With approximately 475 men in San Francisco
diagnosed with AIDS, the director of public health announced
that the city would prohibit sexual contacts in gay bathhouses
and close down any establishment that did not comply with the
new prohibition. 5 Six months later, the public health director
ordered the closure of fourteen gay bathhouses and clubs. The
bathhouses were allowed to reopen in November 1985 under
strict court-ordered guidelines regulating sexual contacts.2
Those regulations "ordered operators to hire employees to
monitor patrons; ordered doors removed from private cubicles;
and required the bathhouses to expel patrons seen engaging in
'high-risk sexual activity.'
20 7
What is important, for present purposes, is that the justifica-
tion offered by the proponents of regulation was harn, not mo-
rality. The justification was the potential threat of the spread of
AIDS. The director of public health accused the establishments
of "fostering disease and death" by allowing high-risk sexual
contacts.0 8 In other words, the city officials relied on harm ar-
corrections officer); Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. 1992) (pet. ref'd) (at-
tempted murder conviction upheld where HIV positive defendant spit on prison
guard with intent to infect). See generally, Comment, Deadly and Dangerous Weapons
and AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74 IowA L. REv. 951 (1989).
Subsequent to many of these cases, legislatures in different states began passing
criminal legislation creating the offense of intentionally exposing another person to
AIDS or HIV. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992) (subsequently
deleted in 1994). See generally Marvin E. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being
Criminalized, GRIM. Jusr., Fall 1988, at 6; Kathleen Sullivan & Martha Field, AIDS and
the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988). For a discussion
of regulation in the military context, see infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
20' The Bathhouse War: San Francisco's Move to Fight AIDS Creates Rift Among Gays,
WASH. PoST, Apr. 19, 1984, available in 1984 WL 2040939.
'6 Mark Z. Barabak, Lax Enforcement of Ban: Risky Bathhouse Sex Goes On, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 18, 1985, available in 1985 WL 3509968.
207 See id.; see also Saul, supra note 7, at 4; Jerry Schwartz, Council Authorizes Closure of
Bathhouses, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 25, 1985, available in 1985 WL 2880269.
2 Sex Clubs Must Close, WASH. PosT, Oct. 10, 1984, available in 1984 WL 2011996.
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guments, rather than legal moralism, even though legal moralism
may have been sufficient as a legal matter.
The same thing happened in New York City, beginning in
October 1985. Around that time, the Republican mayoral can-
didate, Diane McGrath, and the New York State AIDS Advisory
Council recommended that gay bathhouses be closed in order
to stop the spread of AIDS.209 The AIDS advisory panel pro-
posed regulations that would have required gay bathhouses to
get rid of bathtubs and other communal areas for sexual activ-
ity, ensured proper lighting, made condoms available, and
posted AIDS information. 210  Former Governor Mario Cuomo
endorsed the regulations and threatened to close down any
bathhouses that did not comply.
Cuomo emphasized that the regulations were aimed at
curbing the spread of AIDS: "We know certain sexual behavior
can be fatal," Cuomo said at a press conference. 'We must
eliminate public establishments which profit from activities that
foster this deadly disease. 2 1  Immediately following Cuomo's
endorsement, the New York State Public Health Council ruled
that local health authorities could close down gay bathhouses-
asserting that "an AIDS emergency is at hand., 21 2 The Council
declared that bathhouses were a public nuisance because high-
risk sexual activities took place there. Dr. David Axelrod, New
York State health commissioner, explained the emergency pro-
cedure, stating that "[e]very day we wait there are additional
people who are being exposed., 213 The regulations were com-
monly referred to as "emergency anti-AIDS regulations" and
211 SeeJoe Calderone, Mayoral Candidates Field Questions, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1985, at
10 ("McGrath repeated her proposal to close gay bathhouses, bars and pornographic
shops 'that accommodate... sexual activity on the premises' to try to stop the spread
of AIDS."); Saul Friedman, AZDS Panel: Regulate Bathhouses, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1985, at
19 ("The state AIDS Advisory Council recommended yesterday that sex establish-
ments and gay bathhouses be regulated or closed as part of an effort to prevent the
further spread of AIDS.").
210 See Saul, supra note 7, at 4.
211 Id.




were endorsed by, among others, the federal Center for Disease
Control.
14
New York City health officials began implementing the
regulations in November and December 1985, enjoining the
closure of a gay bar and a bathhouse under the emergency
regulations. 215 They closed another bathhouse in the spring of
1986.216 The closures were upheld by the Appellate Division.1
By November 1986, one year after the emergency regulations,
two bathhouses had been closed and three had shut on their
own, reducing the number of gay bathhouses in New York City
by half.218 Ultimately, gay bathhouses were allowed to reopen in
1990, provided that they not maintain "private rooms which are
not continuously open to visual inspection.
21 9
Similar efforts at regulating gay bathhouses occurred in
other major cities, including Los Angeles, where regulations
were first implemented and then agreed upon in a 1992 settle-
ment of a legal challenge.220 In other cities, like Houston and
Washington, D.C., gay bathhouses closed on their own or con-
verted into gymnasiums, because of the sharp drop in clien-
214 See e.g., N.Y. AIDS Law Padlocks First Gay Bar, SAN DIEO UNIoN-TRIBUNE, Nov. 8,
1985, at A16 (referring to "emergency anti-AIDS regulations").
215 See, e.g., id. (closing of gay bar); Paul Moses, Bathhouse Fights Close, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 28, 1985, at 11; Sharman Stein, St. Mark's Baths Shut as AIDS Threat, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 7, 1985, at 10.
216 See Second Bathhouse Closed Over AIDS, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1986, at 20.
217 Ellis Henican, AIDS Scare Hasn't Closed Bathhouses, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1986, at 7.
218 
Id.
219 City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 562 N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
220 See Addenda, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1985, available in 1985 WL 2081380 ("The
Board of Supervisors voted to close gay bathhouses in Los Angeles County if they ref-
use to comply with new regulations aimed at slowing the spread of the virus linked to
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). The board will require the estimated
20 bathhouses to provide 'monitors' to evict patrons if they have 'high-risk' sex.");
Bettina Boxall, A Look Ahead, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL
13994205 ("Some baths closed. Others fought back in the courts, beginning a legal
battle that ended with a 1992 settlement keeping them open with the understanding
that they would prohibit anal sex without a condom and offer safe sex information
and condoms to patrons."); Kevin Roderick, L.A. Gay Panel Favors Closure of Bath-
houses, LA. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1985, at Al; Ted Vollmer & Cathleen Decker, L.A. County
to Draft Guide for Gay Bathhouses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1985, available in 1985 WL
2016389.
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tele.221 Still other cities relied on zoning ordinances to close
down gay clubs.222 At the federal level, the House of Representa-
tives passed a measure in October 1985 allowing the surgeon
general to close down public bathhouses.223 And the House of
Delegates of the American Medical Association also endorsed in
1986 efforts to close down gay bathhouses.224
The controversy over the closing of gay bathhouses demon-
strates well how the AIDS epidemic became a symbol of harm
and was used to justify restrictions on homosexual conduct. It
was-and still is-a powerful rhetorical device in the debate
over the regulation of homosexual conduct.s As a result, to-
day, in many cases, the harm associated with the potential
spread of AIDS has replaced legal moralism as the legal justifica-
tion for restrictive legislation.228
2' See House Measure Won't Stop Sex, Officials Say, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1985, avail-
able in 1985 WL 3682395 (the two gay bathhouses in Houston turned into gymnasi-
ums because of lack of business); Michael Specter, One of D.C. "s 2 Gay Bathhouses Closes
As in Other Cities, Fear of AIDS and Controversy Hurt Business, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1985,
available in 1985 WL 2100609.
222 See Boxall, supra note 220 (discussing Los Angeles' use of zoning ordinances to
close gay clubs, and comparing the actions of other communities).
See House Passes Tough Bill to Fight AIDS, Cm. TIuB., Oct. 4, 1985,'available in 1985
WL 2549710.
24 AMA Wants Smoking Banned in Planes, Hospitals, Schools, AT.ANTA J., June 19,
1986, available in 1986 WL 283579.
2" It has also infiltrated the regulation of heterosexual high risk activities. The
anti-AIDS regulations have also been enforced in the context of adult bookstores
more generally. See Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 693 F. Supp. 774 (D. Minn. 1988),
affd, 898 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1990) (ruling that city ordinance requiring removal of
booth doors in adult bookstore is narrowly tailored to legitimate city interest in re-
ducing spread of AIDS). See also infra Part III.G (discussing regulation of fornica-
tion).
226 1 have set aside, for purposes of this discussion, the debate over consensual ho-
mosexual sadomasochistic practices, because those practices raise complicated collat-
eral questions concerning consent and physical force. For an introduction to that
debate, see Linda Williams, Pornographies On/scene, or Diff-rent Strokes for Diff'rent Folks,
in SEx EXPOSED: SEXUALrIYAND THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE 233, 245-52 (Lynne Segal &
Mary McIntosh eds., 1992) (arguing that sadomasochistic practices serve useful sub-
versive purposes); Didi Herman, Law and Morality Re-visited: The Politics of Regulating
Sado-Masochistic Porn/Practice, 15 STUD. L., POL. & Soc'Y 147 (1996) (reviewing the lit-
erature and arguing that sadomasochistic practices are immoral). It is interesting to
note that these practices may raise very similar issues in the debate over the legal en-
forcement of morality. See Laskey v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997)
(upholding convictions for assault and wounding in cases involving consensual ho-
mosexual sado-masochistic practices, in part, on the grounds of harm; Court held
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E. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND HARM
The traditional liberal position on alcohol consumption was
always murky, in large part because ofJohn Stuart Mill's writing
on temperance. Relying on the harm and offense principles,
Mill justified a wide and complex regulatory scheme directed at
discouraging the use of alcohol. In addition to the prohibition
on consuming excessive amounts of alcohol that could rightly
be imposed on persons with prior convictions for drunken vio-
lence22 7 and on soldiers or policemen on duty,228 as well as the
prohibition on public intoxication, Mill also approved of tax-
ing the sale of alcohol and regulating the sale and consumption
of liquor.30 Mill defended taxation on the ground that some
taxation on consumption was inevitable and that it may as well
be directed against disfavored consumption. "It is... the duty
of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what com-
modities the consumers can best spare; and afortiori, to select in
preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very mod-
erate quantity, to be positively injurious.,231 As a result, Mill con-
cluded, "[t]axation . . . of stimulants up to the point which
produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the
State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissi-




Mill also favored the regulation of alcohol-serving estab-
lishments, but opposed limiting the number of "beer and spirit
houses. 233 Because of its direct relevance to the contemporary
Chicago temperance movement, I will quote his lengthy discus-
sion verbatim:
All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and
places of this kind peculiarly, because offenses against society are espe-
cially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of
that "in deciding whether or not to prosecute, the State authorities were entitled to
have regard not only to the actual seriousness of the harm caused.., but also ... to
the potential for harm inherent in the acts in question").
n7 MILL, supra note 27, at 96-97.
's Id. at 80.
Id. at 97.
2, Id. at 99-100.
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selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to per-
sons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such
regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite
for public surveillance; and to withdraw the license if breaches of the
peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the
keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and
preparing offenses against the law. Any further restriction I do not con-
ceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for in-
stance, of beer and spirit houses, for the express purpose of rendering
them more difficult of access and diminishing the occasions of tempta-
tion, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by
whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society
in which the laboring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages,
and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admis-
sion to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the
laboring classes are professedly governed in any free country 
....234
As this passage suggests, Mill opposed limiting the number
of liquor establishments, but nevertheless justified significant
regulations on the operation of bars and lounges. He justified
these regulations because he perceived alcohol consumption as,
in some sense, causally related to crime and the need for police
expenditures.
Mill's position on alcohol consumption, then, was slightly
inconsistent. In certain passages, Mill viewed the consumption
of alcohol both as an offense, in the case of public intoxication,
and as a harm that justified numerous regulations and, in some
cases, prohibition. Milljustified taxing alcohol in order to make
the cost of drinking prohibitive-especially, one would assume,
among the less wealthy. In other passages, however, Mill op-
posed making access to alcohol more difficult because it would
treat the laboring classes paternalistically. This seems inconsis-
tent, or, at the very least, ambiguous.
In addition, Mill's discussion of alcohol consumption was
somewhat at odds with his other applications of the harm prin-
ciple in On Liberty. In the context of drinking, it seems, Mill
failed to distinguish between harmful and harmless private con-
sumption of alcohol. Surely the private consumption of alcohol
in one's own home, even to excess, was not necessarily harmful
from a Millian perspective. Certainly the private consumption




than engaging in acts of prostitution. Why then would Mill jus-
tify taxing the sale of stimulants, but not regulating fornication?
The ambiguity in Mill's writings had a significant impact on
the 1960s progressive position on drinking-a position which
was equally murky. If anything, the progressive position rested
on the offense principle. Drinking alcohol fit well within the
framework of Hart's analysis of prostitution: the public manifes-
tations should be prohibited in order to avoid any affront to
public decency-"in order to protect the ordinary citizen, who
is an unwilling witness of it in the streets, from something offen-
sive.,'- The justification for regulation was based on public of-
fense, which explains why the matter of drinking generally fell
under the rubric of "public decency." In Joel Feinberg's later
work, Feinberg acknowledged one potential harm associated
with drinking-specifically the risk of vehicular homicide and
accidents-but nevertheless stressed the interests of the majority
of innocent or harmless drinkers in being allowed to continue
to drink.236
Lord Devlin, in response to Hart, focused on the ambigui-
ties of the progressive position. Devlin criticized the traditional
liberal reliance, first, on the public-private distinction and, sec-
ond, on the distinction between harmful and harmless private
drinking. With regard to the latter, Devlin emphasized the
harm that could be associated with private drinking and argued
that there is no principled way to distinguish between harmless
and harmful private drinking. According to Devlin, the deter-
mination of harm had to be made on a case-by-case basis and, as
a result, there could be no principled opposition to complete
prohibition if necessary. After an abbreviated discussion of
' HART, supra note 40, at 45.
2 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 197.
" 7In Mill on Liberty in Morals, Devlin wrote:
[W]hile a few people getting drunk in private cause no problem at all, widespread drunk-
enness, whether in private or public would create a social problem. The line between
drunkenness that creates a social problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the interven-
tion of the law and that which does not, cannot be drawn on the distinction between pri-
vate indulgence and public sobriety. It is a practical one, based on an estimate of what can
safely be tolerated whether in public or in private.... [T] here is no doctrinal answer even
to complete prohibition. It cannot be said that so much is the law's business but more is
not.
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harm, however, Devlin returned to his principal argument con-
cerning legal moralism and his claim that shared morality is es-
sential to social cohesion.m
The debate over the regulation of alcohol consumption,
then, had traditionally been fragmented. The progressive posi-
tion was itself fractured. Mill had offered both harm and of-
fense arguments in support of regulation. Later progressive
thinkers focused increasingly on the offense argument, but nev-
ertheless recognized potential harms. More conservative think-
ers, like Devlin, capitalized on the ambiguity to argue about
both harm and morality.
Today, however, the debate seems less fragmented, again,
because contemporary proponents of regulation and prohibi-
tion have focused on the harm argument. The recent social
and political movements in Chicago and New York City have
zoomed-in on the specific causal relationship between liquor
and harm. In Chicago, the new temperance movement has tar-
geted liquor stores, bars and lounges because of the harm they
are causing neighborhoods. The movement justifies closing
businesses in order to revitalize neighborhoods, to cut down on
crime, and to increase property value and commerce. 2-9 Rever-
end Al Meeks, a Baptist minister and leader of the temperance
movement, emphasizes that the closures are economic measures,
and not moralistic measures. "We're trying to redevelop our
community," Meeks explains. "This is not a return to Prohibi-
tion, we're not saying that people can't drink. We're not even
saying that people can't buy alcohol .... We're simply saying
that on a commercial strip we need to have some immediate re-
development., 24 Chicago Mayor Richard Daley makes the same
point. "This is a quality of life issue," Daley suggests, "not an at-
tempt to impose prohibition."2 41
The target is slightly different in New York City, but the fo-
cus is also on harm. Mayor Giuliani's policing initiative has tar-
DEVuN, supra note 36, at 113.
2id. at 114.
"' SeeAnnin, supra note 1; Gibson, supra note 1; Siegel, supra note 1; VoteDry Refer-
enda, supra note 1.
210 Vote Drty Referenda, supra note 1.
24, Booze and Ballots, supra note 2.
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geted public drunks because of the harm they cause neighbor-
hoods. The justification, again, is the broken windows argu-
ment, and the claim that small disorder causes serious crime.
On the basis of this justification, the New York Police Depart-
ment has cracked-down-and continues to crack-down-on
"the squeegee pests; people urinating in public; people drinking
in public, [and] illegal peddling.,
242
The more intense focus on harm by contemporary propo-
nents of legal regulation and prohibition has transformed the
contemporary debate. It has undermined whatever remained of
the harm principle in the context of alcohol consumption-al-
ready a thin fragment of a principle in the 1960s due to Mill's
ambiguous writings on temperance. It has focused the debate
on the different kinds of harm associated with liquor, ranging
from the harms to commerce and community, to increased se-
rious crime. And it has forced the participants in the debate to
weigh harms, to value harms, and to compare harms. On these
issues the harm principle itself offers no guidance.
F. DRUG USE AND HARM
The structure of the debate over the criminalization of the
use of psychoactive drugs has also changed significantly since
the 1960s. The early progressive argument that the use of mari-
juana was a "victimless crime" was countered in the late 1970s
and 1980s by a campaign against drug use that emphasized the
harms to society, and justified an all-out war on drugs. The pro-
ponents of legal enforcement-in this case modeled on military
enforcement-forcefully deployed the harm argument. Here,
again, the harm principle experienced an ideological shift from
its progressive origins: today, the debate over drug use pits con-
servative harm arguments against new progressive arguments
about "harm reduction."
The progressive position in the 1960s and early 1970s was
characterized by the argument that marijuana use was essen-
tially a "victimless" crime. In his 1968 book, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, Herbert Packer emphasized the "fact" that
2
42 Bratton, supra note 3, at 789 (emphasis added).
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"the available scientific evidence strongly suggests that mari-
juana is less injurious than alcohol and may even be less injuri-
ous than ordinary cigarettes."243 Packer refuted, one-by-one, the
various claims of harm-including the claims that marijuana use
stimulates aggression, causes anti-social behavior, and leads to
the use of stronger narcotics. "[T]here is a total lack of solid
evidence connecting its use with the commission of other
crimes in a causative way," Packer argued. 4  Professor John
Kaplan, in his 1970 book Marijuana-The New Prohibition, simi-
larly offered a point-by-point rebuttal of practically every possi-
ble harm argument associated with the use of marijuana.2 45 My
colleague, Ted Schneyer, suggested that Kaplan's "treatment of
these issues is unassailable and, on the basis of existing evi-
dence, Kaplan's conclusion seems warranted-marijuana use can
be considered no more harmful to users and other members of society
than the use of alcohoL A46 Schneyer remarked that Kaplan's ar-
guments "are applicable ... to policymaking in the general area
of 'victimless' crime.2 47 Joel Feinberg placed the case of the use
of psychoactive drugs under the rubric of "legal paternalism"-
the principle that justifies criminal sanctions where an activity
causes possible harm to the actor, but no harm to others. 8
All that has changed today. The conservative harm argu-
ments disarmed the traditional progressive position. Today, the
opponents of drug prohibition-a loosely grouped coalition
critical of current anti-drug enforcement policies249 -argue
PACKER, supra note 91, at 338.
244id
"' See JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-TM NEW PROHIBmON (1970).24 TheodoreJ. Schneyer, Problems in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Marijuana Legislation,
24 STAN. L. REV. 200 (1971) (book review) (emphasis added).
2
47 Id. at 201.
' 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 12-13.
... The status and motivations of this coalition is itself a source of significant con-
testation and acrimonious debate. Proponents of drug prohibition characterize the
coalition as "the drug legalization movement" and suggest that their motives are to
legalize all psychoactive drugs. See Testimony of Bany R, McCaffrey, Director, Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy Before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Sub-
committee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources; The Drug Legalization
Movement in America, Part I: What Proponents of Legalization Really Want: Easy Access to All
Drugs of Abuse (June 16, 1999) <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/testi-
mony/legalization/partL eng.htm> [hereinafter McCaffrey Testimony] ("Careful ex-
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about "harm reduction." The term "harm reduction" was
crafted in the early 1990s as an- alternative to "legalization. ''u °
Ethan Nadelmann, the director of the Lindesmith Center (a
drug policy reform center established in New York City with
funding from George Soros) and a leading spokesperson for the
reform coalition, explains the "harm reduction" argument: we
must "[a] ccept that drug use is here to stay and that we have no
choice but to learn to live with drugs so that they cause the least
possible harm. ,' Rather than continue the war on drugs,
Nadelmann argues, "[t] he more sensible and realistic approach
today would be one based on the principles of 'harm reduc-
tion.' It's a policy that seeks to reduce the negative conse-
quences of both drug use and drug prohibition, acknowledging
that both are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. ' 'u2
Nadelmann explains:
What does "harm reduction" mean in practice? ... "Harm reduc-
tion" means designing policies that are likely to do more good than
harm, and trying to anticipate the consequences of new policy initiatives.
. .."Harm reduction" requires governments to keep public health pre-
cepts and objectives front and center in its drug control policies, and to
banish the racist and xenophobic impulses that stirred prohibitionist
amination of the words-speeches, webpostings, and writings-and actions of many
who advocate policies to 'reduce the harm' associated with illegal drugs reveals a
more radical intent. In reality, their drug policy reform proposals are far too often a
thin veneer for drug legalization."); Barry R. McCaffrey, Legalization Would Be the
Wrong Direction, LA TIMES, July 27, 1998, at All, available in 1998 WL 2449260
("[T]he real intent of many harm reduction advocates is the legalization of drugs.").
The critics of current anti-drug enforcement policies view themselves as a diverse
group that includes drug legalizers as well as persons "who vigorously oppose any
broader trend toward disassembling the drug prohibition system." Ethan A. Nadel-
mann, Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition, DAEDALUS, Summer
1992, at 85, 88-89. Nadelmann argues, "[tihe fact is, there is no drug legalization
movement in America. What there is is a nascent political and social movement for
drug policy reform." Nadelmann, Perspective on LegalizingDrugs, supra note 11.
"0 In fact, as late as 1988, the most vocal advocate of "harm reduction," Ethan
Nadelmann, still made the argument for "legalization," rather than "harm reduc-
tion." See, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, PUBIC I=tEREST, Sum-
mer 1988, at 3-17 (making the case for legalization without explicitly focusing on the
label "harm reduction").
"' Nadelmann, Learning to Live With Drugs, supra note 11 (emphasis added). See
also Nadelmann, Perspective on Legalizing Drugs, supra note 11.2
12 Nadelmann, Learning to Live With Drugs, supra note 11.
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sentiments and laws earlier in this century.... "Harm reduction" means
keeping our priorities in order." 3
In fact, the "harm reduction" movement has cleverly turned
the table on the conservative harm arguments, focusing instead
on the harms caused by the policies prohibiting drug use.
"[M] any, perhaps most, 'drug problems' in the Americas are the
results not of drug use per se but of our prohibitionist poli-
cies,"'' 4 Nadelmann claims. The greater harms, then, are "the
harms that flow from our prohibitionist policies."25 Nadelmann
emphasizes: "[Milton] Friedman, [Thomas] Szasz and I agree
on many points, among them that U.S. drug prohibition, like
alcohol Prohibition decades ago, generates extraordinary harms."' 6
The concept of "harm reduction" traces its origins to alter-
native public policies adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s
in the Netherlands and Great Britain. Policies there were de-
signed to render drug use safer and thereby reduce the harms
associated with illicit drug use-including the transmission of
diseases like AIDS or hepatitis, and the risks of overdose. Poli-
cies were also developed to separate out certain drug markets
(marijuana and hashish) from others (heroin), and to relax, but
still regulate, the possession and sale of small quantities of mari-
juana. These policies became part of a public health approach
to drug use that now includes methadone programs, needle ex-
change programs, and community outreach programs, in con-
trast to the more punitive measures associated with the war on
drugs. And they are now part of the domestic "harm reduc-
tion" agenda.
The counter-argument from proponents of the enforce-
ment of anti-drug laws has been to argue even greater harm. Barry
McCaffrey, director of the Office of National Drug Control Pol-






2 Nadelmann, Perspective on LegalizingDrugs, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
2 See generally REDUCING DRUG-RELATED HARM: NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND
PRACrIcE (Peter McDermott & Pat O'Hare, eds. 1992); PSYcHOACTE DRUGS & HARM
REDUCTION: FROM FArFH TO SCIENCE (Nick Heather et al. eds., 1993); see also Nadel-
mann, Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition, supra note 249, at 85-132.
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the "harm reduction" argument: "The plain fact is that drug
abuse wrecks lives."' 8 "[E]ach year drug use contributes to
50,000 deaths and costs our society $110 billion in social
costs." '9 McCaffrey also extolls the benefits of prohibition: "In
the past 20 years, drug use in the United States decreased by
half and casual cocaine use by 70%. ' '2° McCaffrey's response, in
a nut-shell, is that "[a] ddictive drugs were criminalized because
they are harmful; they are not harmful because they were
criminalized."2 1
In testimony before Congress, McCaffrey has referred to the
"harm reduction" movement as "a carefully-camouflaged, well-
funded, tightly-knit core of people whose goal is to legalize drug
use in the United States. It is critical to understand that what-
ever they say to gain respectability in social circles, or to gain
credibility in the media and academia, their common goal is to
legalize drugs.,162 And, in a recent editorial, McCaffrey argues
that:
The so-called harm-reduction approach to drugs confuses people
with terminology. All drug policies claim to reduce harm. No reason-
able person advocates a position consciously designed to be harmful.
The real question is which policies actually decrease harm and increase
good. The approach advocated by people who say they favor "harm re-
duction" would in fact harm Americans.
As a result, today, both conservatives and progressives are
making harm arguments. The debate is over which harms are
worse. In that debate, the harm principle is silent.
G. OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF CONSERVATIVE HARM ARGUMENTS
There are numerous other illustrations of the increased
proliferation of conservative harm arguments. Debates over
fornication and adultery, for example, are two other areas of
sexual morality where proponents of regulation have, in certain
discrete instances, turned to harm arguments. Surprisingly,
McCaffrey, Legalization Would be the WrongDirection, supra note 249.
2 9 McCaffrey Testimony, supra note 249.
'6 'McCaffrey, Legalization Would be the WrongDirection, supra note 249.
261 Barry R. McCaffrey, Don't Legalize Those Drugs, WASH. PosT, June 29, 1999, at
A15, available in 1999 WL 107011390.
.. McCaffrey Testimony, supra note 249.
2' McCaffrey, Legalization Would Be the WrongDirection, supra note 249.
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Lord Devlin himself had excluded fornication and adultery
(and possibly lesbian sexual relations26) from the list of pur-
portedly immoral activities that ought to be prohibited. Devlin
acknowledged that fornication and adultery were as immoral
and dangerous to society as homosexuality, but suggested that
they were impossible to eradicate. "Adultery of the sort that
breaks up marriage seems to me to be just as harmful to the so-
cial fabric as homosexuality or bigamy," Devlin wrote. "The
only ground for putting it outside the criminal law is that a law
which made it a crime would be too difficult to enforce; it is too
generally regarded as a human weakness not suitably punished by im-
prisonment.', 26 Accordingly, Devlin concluded that "[a] 11 that the
law can do with fornication is to act against its worst manifesta-
tions,"' 6 by which he meant brothels and commercial sex.
Once again, however, the AIDS epidemic has changed the
equation-in this case, beyond even Devlin's imagination. The
possible risk of the spread of AIDS through sexual contact has
become an argument militating in favor of regulating fornica-
tion by persons infected with the HIV virus. In both the hetero-
sexual and homosexual contexts, the possibility of the spread of
AIDS has justified, in certain cases, criminalizing, and in other
cases, enhancing the culpability of, certain sexual acts. I am not
referring here to nonconsensual acts, such as sexual assault, nor
am I referring to unprotected, unwarned consensual acts of
sexual intercourse. These categories of acts are classically
within the scope of the criminal law. Where the legal enforce-
ment of morality issues arise are in the cases of informed
and/or protected sexual activity. It is there that we see AIDS be-
ing used as the harm that justifies the regulation of sexual activ-
ity.
This has been most clearly demonstrated in the military
context. There, informed but unprotected consensual sexual
intercourse between unmarried, noncivilian partners, where
26 Devlin wrote, seemingly approvingly, that "adultery, fornication, and lesbianism
are untouched by the criminal law" and suggested that this fact "does not prove that
homosexuality ought not to be touched." DEVLiN, supra note 36, at 22.2




one of the partners is HIV-infected, is proscribed. In other
words, even where the service member who is HIV-positive fully
discloses that he or she is infected, the service member can be
prosecuted for aggravated assault if he or she engages in unpro-
tected sexual intercourse with an uninfected, unmarried, non-
civilian partner.267  Moreover, unwarned but protected
consensual sexual intercourse between unmarried service
members is also prohibited. It will support a conviction for ag-
gravated assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or
force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm.2
The United States government, in fact, has argued in court
that there is a compelling interest in the complete celibacy of
HIV-positive service members. The government justified its po-
sition based on the harm associated with the potential spread of
AIDS. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Services did not
rule on the point, and thus has left open the question whether a
conviction for aggravated assault would stand in the case of pro-
tected, informed, consensual sex between unmarried service
members. 6 9
With the exception of the military, adultery today is effec-
tively beyond the scope of the criminal law. The few states that
have failed to repeal their criminal laws against adultery do not
enforce the prohibitions. Thus, there would be little more to
say about adultery were it not for the recent impeachment pro-
ceedings against President Bill Clinton: the debate over
Clinton's impeachment reflected an emphasis on harm that was,
in many ways, similar to the harm arguments being made in the
context of other moral offenses. During the proceedings, both
the House managers and the President's attorneys drew a line
between the sexual offense of adultery and the political harm
that it may cause. Both sides agreed that a President should not
be impeached because of the immorality of adultery. Where
2167 See United States v. Bygrave, 46 MJ. 491, 497 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (upholding con-
viction for aggravated assault).2" See United States v.Joseph, 37 MJ. 392 (G.M-.A 1993) (upholding conviction for
aggravated assault).
26' See Bygrave, 46 M.J. at 494-95 n.8.
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they disagreed was on whether the President's immoral activity
had caused political harm.
The President's attorneys and advocates attempted to por-
tray the case against Clinton as a case merely about sex. This was
most poignantly reflected in the presentation of Dale Bumpers,
former Democratic Senator from Arkansas, during closing ar-
gument in the Senate impeachment proceedings. "H.L. Men-
cken said one time, 'When you hear somebody say, 'This is not
about money,' it's about money,"' Bumpers argued. "And when




As Richard Posner suggests, in his recent book An Affair of State,
"[f]rom the beginning, the main line of defense for Clinton was
that the scandal and the ensuing investigation by the Independ-
ent Counsel were just about sex., 271 By invoking sex, the Presi-
dent's defenders were attempting to put the controversy in the
liberal safe harbor: if it was about sex and adultery, and about
the typical cover-up that attends such misconduct, then the con-
troversy did not rise to the level of harmful or impeachable
conduct.
In contrast, the House managers and advocates of im-
peachment attempted to portray the case against Clinton as a
case about political harm. They were focusing on the harm that
would result to the rule of law if the President's purported per-
jury and obstrucjion of justice were not redressed. Their argu-
ment was that the case against Clinton was not about sex, but
rather about injury to the rule of law. This was reflected in the
response that Representative Henry Hyde, the chief House
manager, made to Dale Bumpers' presentation:
I'm a World War II combat veteran. I hit the beaches under Japa-
nese fire, and I know what I was fighting for. I was fighting for freedom
and to have an opportunity, the same as anybody else, to make a life for
myself. Justice, the rule of law-that's just a phrase that encompasses
equal protection of the law and opportunity for everybody. And I believe
that's what every G.I. fought for.
2
2
2' Weight of History is "On All of Us," Senate is Told by One of Its Own, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
22, 1999, at A17 (transcript of Dale Bumpers presentation).
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND
TRiAL OF PRESMENT CUiNTON 213 (1999).2n Alison Mitchell, Hyde Cites His WarPast, Too, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 22, 1999, at A17.
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In effect, the impeachment debate became a controversy
between two different ways of characterizing Clinton's miscon-
duct: as sexual misconduct that was politically harmless, or as a
politically harmful assault on the rule of law.
In this regard, Richard Posner's contribution to the im-
peachment debate is of particular interest. Posner describes
two factions within the Right-the "libertarian conservatives)
273
and the "moralistic conservaives"274and assails the moralistic
conservatives for obscuring the debate by talking about
Clinton's immorality and his attitude toward sex. Posner argues
that the real issue was the potential damage to the rule of law.
For Posner, the conduct at issue was "conduct to which sex is
almost incidental., 275 Posner agrees with Philip Elman:
The sex was little but the lies were big. As was his [Clinton's] disre-
spect for, and damage to, the rule of law and a judicial process which
depends for its effective functioning upon truthful testimony of wit-
nesses. In rapid succession came repeated lying in court, encouraging
others to join and support his lies, perjury and subornation of perjury;
obstruction ofjustice; use of government officials and employees under
his direction... to spread and support his lies; his casual contempt for
judicial oaths; his frivolous and unprecedented invocation of executive
privilege ... his use of the presidential "bully pulpit" to hoodwink the
American people .... 7
"That is the conduct," Posner emphasizes, "on which the debate
should have focused.2 77
Within the factions of conservatism that Posner identifies,
Posner falls squarely in the libertarian camp. This is the camp
that effectively employed the political harm argument. I would
27 The libertarian wing of the Right are described as "closer to John Stuart Mill
(whether they know it or not) than they are to William Buckley and Jerry Falwell."
POSNER, supra note 271, at 201. Posner writes:
They support free markets and limited government. They want government to concen-
trate on national defense and the repression of serious crimes and to go easy on redistrib-
uting income and wealth. They don't worry a lot about the "moral tone" of society and
hence about homosexuality, abortion, pornography, and recreational drug use.
Id at 201-02.
2' The "moralistic conservatives," according to Posner, agree with the libertarians
on many issues, but are obsessed about "homosexuality, premarital and extramarital
sex, feminism, and abortion." Id. at 204.
2" Id. at 207.
26 Id. at 207-08.
2nId at 208.
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suggest that the House managers were also primarily in that
camp, and that, as a result, the political debate revolved impor-
tanty around the notion of political harm. Ultimately, Posner is
unsure whether Clinton's conduct has caused, or will really
cause, harm to the country. " IT] he actual impact that his con-
duct has had or will have on the rule of law and other valued so-
cial goods is unknowable and possibly slight."2 8 But what is
clear is that, if Posner had had a vote and had voted for im-
peachment, it would have been on the ground of potential pub-
lic harm. Posner'sjustification would have been that, in his own
words, "President Clinton engaged in a pattern of criminal be-
havior and obsessive public lying the tendency of which was to
disparage, undermine, and even subvert the judicial system of
the United States, the American ideology of the rule of law, and
the role and office of the President.
27 9
Regardless of one's political position on impeachment, what
was remarkable was how far the political harm argument car-
ried-that it led to the second impeachment of a sitting Presi-
dent-and the extent to which it prolonged the Senate
impeachment proceedings. What is remarkable is the dominant
role of the harm argument-in this context, the political harm
argument-despite the overwhelming popular support of the
President.
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PRiNCIPLE
A. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF HARMS
Pornography, prostitution, disorderly conduct, homosexual-
ity, intoxication, drug use, and fornication: with regard to each
of these, the proponents of legal enforcement are now deploy-
ing the harm argument in support of a conservative agenda.
The arguments are powerful. It is hard to respond adequately
to the harm to women caused by pornography and prostitution,
to the threat of the spread of AIDS caused by high-risk activities
like homosexual and heterosexual fornication, or to the neigh-





titutes, smut shops, and liquor establishments. The harm ar-
guments are particularly compelling when the conception of
harm has been pared down to its bare bones and brackets out
other normative values.
The proliferation of harm arguments in the debate over the
legal enforcement of morality has effectively collapsed the harm
principle. Harm to others is no longer today a limiting princi-
ple. It no longer excludes categories of moral offenses from the
scope of the law. It is no longer a necessary (but not sufficient) con-
dition, because there are so many non-trivial harm arguments.
Instead of focusing on whether certain conduct causes harm,
today the debates center on the types of harm, the amounts of
harm, and our willingness, as a society, to bear the harms. And
the harm principle is silent on those questions.
The harm principle is silent in the sense that it does not de-
termine whether a non-trivial harm justifies restrictions on lib-
erty, nor does it determine how to compare or weigh competing
claims of harms. It was never intended to be a sufficient condi-
tion. It does not address the comparative importance of harms.
Joel Feinberg's thorough discussion of the harm principle rec-
oguized this important fact. In discussing the relative impor-
tance of harms, Feinberg admitted that "[i]t is impossible to
prepare a detailed manual with the exact 'weights' of all human
interests, the degree to which they are advanced or thwarted by
all possible actions and activities, duly discounted by objective
improbabilities mathematically designated., 280 Thus, Feinberg
concluded, "in the end, it is the legislator himself, using his own
fallible judgment rather than spurious formulas and 'measure-
ments,' who must compare conflicting interests and judge
which are the more important.
281
Feinberg proposed a three-prong test to determine the rela-
tive importance of harms:
Relative importance is a function of three different respects in
which opposed interests can be compared:
a. how 'vital' they are in the interest networks of their possessors;
" 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 203.
281 id.
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b. the degree to which they are reinforced by other interests, pri-
vate and public; 282
c. their inherent moral quality.
But what are the inherent moral qualities of interests af-
fected by claims of harm? And how could the harm principle
tell us what those inherent moral qualities are? In the end, it
can not. The harm principle itself-the simple notion of
harm--does not address the relative importance of harms.
Once non-trivial harm arguments have been made, we inevitably
must look beyond the harm principle. We must look beyond
the traditional structure of the debate over the legal enforce-
ment of morality. We must access larger debates in ethics, law
and politics-debates about power, autonomy, identity, human
flourishing, equality, freedom and other interests and values
that give meaning to the claim that an identifiable harm matters. In
this sense, the proliferation of conservative harm arguments and
the collapse of the harm principle has fundamentally altered
the structure of the future debate over the legal enforcement of
morals.
B. A SKEPTICAL RESPONSE
At this point, some readers of this Article may respond that
the discussion here-especially the emphasis on rhetorical
structure and legal semiotics-is misleading. A skeptical reader
might respond: Truth is, the harm principle is still right today
and the structure of the debate has not really changed. What
we have witnessed, over the past two decades, is not the collapse
of the harm principle, but rather the natural evolution of a use-
ful analytic principle. What we need to do is to continue to re-
fine the harm principle to better address these claims of harm.
The harm principle is fully capable of dealing with these con-
servative harm arguments.
This skeptical response could take either of two forms. The
first variant of the argument is that the harm principle remains
a serviceable distinction and functions entirely properly today.
Progressive thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s were simply wrong
to suggest that pornography, prostitution, or drinking were
"2 Id. at 217; see also id. at 204-06.
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harmless. In fact, they do cause certain harms and therefore
may be legally regulated. Still, there are other activities gener-
ally considered to be morally questionable that are nonetheless
protected by the harm principle. These include, for instance,
masturbation or non-fraudulent lying. Many people might con-
sider these acts immoral, but very few would argue that they
should be regulated by the state because of their harm.
A second version of the argument is that the harm principle
is still a useful critical principle in theory, but that it has been
distorted in practice. The new evidence of harm is simply mis-
leading. We should continue to use the harm principle, but we
must do a betterjob at policing the facts. We should subject the
empirical evidence to more rigorous scrutiny.
I suspect that many opponents of Professor MacKinnon's
argument would respond in this way. Judge Easterbrook in fact
flirts with this response in the Hudnut decision, when he writes
in the margin:
The social science studies are very difficult to interpret, however,
and they conflict. Because much of the effect of speech comes through
a process of socialization, it is difficult to measure incremental benefits
and injuries caused by particular speech. Several psychologists have
found, for example, that those who see violent, sexually explicit films
tend to have more violent thoughts. But how often does this lead to ac-
tual violence? National commissions on obscenity here, in the United
Kingdom, and in Canada have found that it is not possible to demon-
strate a direct link between obscenity and rape or exhibitionism.8 3
This footnote is intended, at the very least, to undermine our
confidence in the causal connection underlying MacKinnon's
harm argument. Similarly, my previous article on the broken
windows theory, Reflecting on the Subject, could be interpreted as
an attempt to police the harm argument underlying the broken
windows hypothesis. The quantitative analysis, in particular the
replication of Wesley Skogan's study on disorder and crime,
could be seen as an effort to prove that the harm allegedly asso-
ciated with disorder has not been established. The article as a
whole could be read as an attempt to police the facts.
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 n.2 (7th Cir.
1985).
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Alternatively, it could be argued that the theories of harm-
not the facts-are wrong. The harm alleged by MacKinnon or
by the broken windows theory relies on an intervening actor-
the rapist, the sexist male, or the armed robber-and therefore
should not be imputed to the original conduct-viewing por-
nography or loitering. In other words, the argument would go,
it is not pornography or disorder that causes serious crime, it is
serious criminals; therefore, the challenged conduct does not
cause harm to others, and should not be regulated. This argu-
ment is somewhat similar to the "perpetrator theories" ad-
vanced by opponents of gun control, or more popularly the
argument that guns don't kill people, people kill people.
214
Under both versions of the argument, the central point is
that the harm principle continues to be a useful analytic princi-
ple and that it is simply undergoing a natural process of evolu-
tion. Like any other analytic principle, it is only clear and easy
when it is first articulated. It becomes more cumbersome as it is
applied in an increasing number of cases. At present, it may
have a temporary conservative tilt, but over the long run, it will
even out politically and continue to be a useful and fair way to
draw the line between law and morality. In other words, the
structure of the debate may be undergoing change, but the
harm principle will nevertheless remain at its core: the harm
principle has not collapsed.
C. THE NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF HARM
The problem with the skeptical response is that it ignores
the hidden normative dimensions of harm and their crucial role
in the application of the harm principle. Those hidden norma-
tive dimensions are what do the work in the harm principle, not
the abstract, simple notion of harm. They limit claims of harm.
They exclude harm arguments. In contrast, the abstract, simple
idea of harm-bracketing out any other normative value-is
broad enough to include most, if not all, of the harms alleged
"' See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., American Homicide Exceptionalism,
69 U. COLO. L. REv. 969, 971 (1998) ("Perpetrator theories ... focus on the motives,
intentions, and risk-taking preferences of individuals instead of on the tools ('instru-
mentalities') that they have selected to carry on their activities.").
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by contemporary proponents of regulation and prohibition. It
is sufficiently robust to include the incitement to rape, the nega-
tive effects on women's sexuality, the stimulus to rob, the possi-
ble spread of AIDS, or the diminution in property values. In
each of these cases, the strength of the abstract claim of harm
will depend on normative assessments of pornography, male
dominance, disorder, crime, or sexual freedom. Depending on
those assessments, harm may be easier or harder to prove. But
experience suggests that some harm attaches to most human ac-
tivities, and especially to conduct that traditionally has been as-
sociated with moral offense. The very fact that society views
these activities with opprobrium itself generates harms. Thus,
even if we set aside the notion of legal rhetoric, the skeptical re-
sponse is not persuasive.
Looking at the historical shifts in the debate through the
lens of legal semiotics, however, offers an important insight: the
ideological shift of the harm principle over the past twenty years
reflects a natural tilt in the original, simple harm principle-a
natural tilt that favors a finding of harm. By returning to the
original, simple statement of the harm principle in the 1960s,
the progressives opened the door to the proliferation of harm
arguments and brought about the collapse of the harm princi-
ple.
This risk was always present. Critics of Mill had warned that
most, if not all, human activity could be deemed to cause harm
to others, and that "no man is an island." Mill acknowledged
this criticism."" So did Hart and Feinberg."' They each tried to
shield the harm principle from this criticism. What I would
suggest, though, is that they were only able to hold the line on
harm-to give the conception of harm a critical edge-by de-
ploying other normative principles. In all three cases, there were
competing normative values lurking behind their definition of
harm, and limiting the scope of the harm principle. 7 In Mill,
' MILL, supra note 27, at 78 ("No person is an entirely isolated being").
' HART, supra note 40, at 5; Feinberg, supra note 40.
217 In this regard, I agree with Professor Gerald Dworkin's suggestion, in his recent
essay Devlin Was Right that if one examines closely the category of harm "one reaches
the conclusion that the term itself is a normative one. Not every setback to a person's
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the supplemental normative principle was the notion of human
self-development; in Hart, it was an emphasis on preventing
human suffering; and in Feinberg, it was the concern for consis-
tency and equal treatment.
With hindsight, the proliferation of harm arguments could
have been predicted. The notion of harm, standing alone, was
not the only critical principle at play in Mill, Hart, or Feinberg.
Yet the original, simple statement of the harm principle at-
tempted to bracket out normative values other than harm. By
paring the harm principle back to its original formulation, pro-
gressive theorists actually undermined its critical potential.
D. HARM IN MILL, HART AND FEINBERG
We saw earlier, in the discussion of Mill's essay On Liberty,
that Mill's treatment of harm led him to an analysis of legal or
recognized rights. Mill referred to these interests as "certain in-
terests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit under-
standing, ought to be considered as rights.' 2sss Mill explained
that a right, in order to be cognizable, must relate in some way
to utility. But, he emphasized, not just any kind of utility. "I re-
gard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions," Mill
famously wrote, "but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive
being."28 9 For Mill, the utilitarian calculus had to be defined in
terms of human self-development.290
interests counts as harmful for the purposes of justifying coercion. Only those that
are 'wrongs' count." Dworkin, supra note 13, at 930.
2" MILL, supra note 27, at 73.
"'Id. at 10.
"0 This interpretation of Mill is consistent with the emerging secondary literature
on Mill that emphasizes the centrality of self-development in Mill's politics. See, e.g.,
BERGER, supra note 31, at 229-30 ("In writing about On Liberty, it is clear that he viewed
the essay as asserting (what I regard as) a powerful, somewhat innovative, positive
doctrine that has important practical consequences, and which is crucial to the ulti-
mate defense of his theory of freedom. This is the doctrine of the importance to
human well-being of individual self-development, or, as I prefer to call it, auton-
omy."); DONNER, supra note 31, at 188-97 ("If we see how Mill explains harm in terms
of interests and note that interests, especially vital interests, ground rights, the posi-
tive defense of the right to liberty of self-development is clarified ...... Id at 191);
Hittinger, supra note 31, at 51-52.
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In Mill's writings, then, the conception of harm was tied to
that of human flourishing.2' The harm principle was supple-
mented by a principle of utility in the interest of "man as a pro-
gressive being.' '2 2 And it resulted in a surprisingly regulated
society. Mill envisioned a society that regulated the sale of po-
tential instruments of crime, s alcohol consumption,24 educa-
tion, 5 and even procreation. s In his essay dedicated to liberty,
Mill even endorsed laws forbidding marriage among the poor in
order to effectively limit the number of children that poor cou-
ples could have.27
Mill did not perceive that these numerous regulations
would infringe on the self-development of humankind, because
the regulations promoted the interests of a more noble and ar-
tistic self. Restrictions on activities like drinking did not present
a threat to human self-development, but rather promoted a
healthier and more noble society. The normative work-the
critical principle-was being done by the concept of human
self-development-by the idea that human beings should be-
come "a noble and beautiful object of contemplation, ' " and
that human life should become "rich, diversified, and animat-
ing, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and
elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every
individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth
2' In this respect, I agree with Professor Gerald Dworkin. See Dworkin, supra note
13, at 934.
2' This is reflected most clearly in Mill's restatement of the harm principle in lay-
man's terms. "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the in-
terests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discussion."
MLL, supra note 27, at 73 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 96.
2" Id. at 100.
2" Id. at 104.
Id. at 107.
27 Mill wrote:
The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the par-
ties can show that they have the means of supporting a family do not exceed the legitimate
powers of the State; and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly de-
pendent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of
liberty.
Id. at 107.
" Id. at 60.
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belonging to."2 In the end, Mill's harm principle was not sim-
ply about harm. It was also, importantly, about human flourish-
300ing.
H.L.A. Hart's writings betray, similarly, an important added
normative dimension to harm. In Hart's case, though, the em-
phasis was not so much on human self-development, but rather
on an abhorrence for human suffering. In this regard, Hart's
writings are similar to those of Ronald Dworkin, who also em-
phasized, in the context of regulating homosexuality, the "mis-
eries of frustration and persecution." 0'
Central to Hart's writings is a concern about human misery.
This concern recurred throughout his debate with Devlin.
Human suffering made an appearance at almost every pivotal
juncture."2 Hart repeatedly referred to the "cost of human suf-
fering"' ' that attends the enforcement of morality-"the misery
and sacrifice of freedom,"3'' 4 "the cost in human misery."0 5 In
fact, Hart vigorously opposed the legal enforcement of morality
precisely because it inflicted so much human suffering. He op-
posed the regulation of homosexuality because it "demand[s]
the repression of powerful instincts with which personal happi-
ness is intimately connected."0 6 Hart attacked Devlin for his
underlying retributiveness. Hart wrote:
Notwithstanding the eminence of its legal advocates, this justifica-
tion of punishment, especially when applied to conduct not harmful to
others, seems to rest on a strange amalgam of ideas. It represents as a
value to be pursued at the cost of human suffering the bare expression
of moral condemnation, and treats the infliction of suffering as a
uniquely appropriate or "emphatic" mode of expression. But is this
really intelligible? Is the mere expression of moral condemnation a
thing of value in itself to be pursued at this cost? The idea that we may
2" Id.
No See Hittinger, supra note 31, at 51 ("Without this philosophy [of human flourish-
ing], I suggest, Mill's famous rule is virtually worthless as a tool in judging which par-
ticular items of conduct might legitimately be counted as the sort of 'harm' that
summons the coercive powers of the law.").
-0, Dworkin, supra note 34, at 992.
'2 HART, supra note 40, at 43, 57, 65, 69.
Id. at 65.





punish offenders against a moral code, not to prevent harm or suffering
or even the repetition of the offence but simply as a means of venting or
emphatically expressing moral condemnation, is uncomfortably close to
human sacrifice as an expression of religious worship.3s 7
Hart's emphasis was on the human aspects of human suffering.
His focus was on individual pain.
Hart suggested, at one point in his lectures, that anyone en-
gaged in the debate over the legal enforcement of morality
must accept "the critical principle, central to all morality, that
human misery and the restriction of freedom are evils."0 8 Oth-
erwise, Hart explained, the legal enforcement of morality would
not call forjustification.3 Of course, the restriction of freedom
was not itself a critical principle since the very purpose of a
critical principle was to find proper limits on freedom. But the
question of human misery certainly was, at least for Hart. Hu-
man misery was the added normative dimension to harm that,
in Hart's writings, reined in the harm principle.
Joel Feinberg, more so than Mill or Hart, explicitly ac-
knowledged the multiple normative dimensions of harm. In
Harm to Others, Feinberg conceded that "harm is a very complex
concept with hidden normative dimensions ... ,,10 Feinberg de-
fined harm in a way that incorporated these normative dimen-
sions s3 and he emphasized in particular the protection of
personal autonomy and the equal respect for persons.1 2 Fein-
berg explained that "the harm principle ... protects personal
autonomy and the moral value of 'respect for persons' that is as-
sociated with it; it incorporates nonarbitrary interest-ranking
3
17 Id. at 65-66.
8 Id. at 82.
30 .Id.
3W 1 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 214.
", See id. at 215.
The term "harm" as it is used in the harm principle refers to those states of set-back in-
terest that are the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others. This interpretation
thus excludes set-back interests produced byjustiyed or excused conduct ("harms" that are not
wrongs), and violations of rights that do not set back interests (wrongs that are not
"harms"). A harm in the appropriate sense then will be produced by morally indefensible
conduct that not only sets back the victim's interest, but also violates his right. A right, in
turn, was analyzed as a vald claim against another's conduct, and what gives cogency to a
claim is the set of reasons that can be proffered in its support.
Id. (emphasis added).
3' See4 FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 12, 81-123.
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principles and principles of fairness regulating competitions; it
'enforces' the moral principles that protect individual projects
that are necessary for human fulfillment.0
13
There is considerable debate over the normative ingredi-
ents in Feinberg's definition of harm and in his liberal position,
and I do not intend to resolve that question here.1 Instead, I
will return to Feinberg's earlier writings on legal reasoning and
his emphasis on consistency and equal treatment of similar
cases, and suggest that those writings corroborate the value of
"respect for persons" that is expressly stated in The Moral Limits.
In those earlier writings, Feinberg advocates a type of moral rea-
soning, similar to legal reasoning, that involves an analysis and
consideration, back and forth, between principle and outcome.
Feinberg described this method of analysis as follows:
The best way to defend one's selection of principles is to show to
which positions they commit one on such issues as censorship of litera-
ture, "moral offenses," and compulsory social security programs. Gen-
eral principles arise in the course of deliberations over particular
problems, especially in the efforts to defend one's judgments by showing
that they are consistent with what has gone before. If a principle com-
mits one to an antecedently unacceptable judgment, then one has to
modify or supplement the principle in a way that does the least damage
to the harmony of one's particular and general opinions taken as a
group. On the other hand, when a solid, well-entrenched principle en-
tails a change in a particular judgment, the overriding claims of consis-
tency may require that the judgment be adjusted. This sort of dialectic is
similar to the reasonings that are prevalent in law courts! 5
What is doing much of the normative work in Feinberg's
writing, then, is a type of legal reasoning based on consistency,
equal treatment of similarly situated persons, analogy, and har-
mony. The harm principle itself does not dictate any specific
resolution with regard to specified moral offenses-it is rather
consistency and equal treatment, and, of course, fundamental
commitments on issues such as "censorship of literature, 'mor-
als offenses,' and compulsory social security programs."16
"I. at 12.
3"' See Buchanan, supra note 31, at 879-81; Dworkin, supra note 13, at 931 & n.15;
GeraldJ. Postema, Collective Evils, Harms, and theLaw, 97 ETIcs 414, 418 (1987).




H.L.A. Hart's return to the original, simple statement of the
harm principle reflected a desire for a bright-line rule that
would draw a clean distinction between law and morality. But
the simple harm principle bracketed out other important nor-
mative dimensions. It excluded Mill's discussion of human
flourishing and Hart's abhorrence for human suffering. It
eliminated the very principles that reined in the harm principle
and actually gave the harm analysis its critical edge. The pre-
dictable result was a proliferation of harm arguments and a
struggle over the meaning of harm. The very simplicity of the
harm principle may explain why harm became universal and
how the struggle over the meaning of harm eventually collapsed
the harm principle.
V. CONCLUSION
During the past two decades, the proponents of regulation
and prohibition of a wide range of human activities-activities
that have traditionally been associated with moral offense-have
turned to the harm argument. Catharine MacKinnon has fo-
cused on the multiple harms to women and women's sexuality
caused by pornography. The broken windows theory of crime
prevention has emphasized how minor crimes, like prostitution
and loitering, cause major crimes, neighborhood decline, and
urban decay. The harm associated with the spread of AIDS has
been used to justify increased regulation of homosexual and
heterosexual conduct. The new temperance movement in Chi-
cago and the quality-of-life initiative in New York City have fo-
cused on the harmful effects of liquor establishments and
public drunks on neighborhoods and property values. The de-
bate on drugs has focused on the harms caused by drug use and
the harms caused by the war on drugs.
The proliferation of conservative harm arguments has pro-
duced an ideological shift in the harm principle from its pro-
gressive origins. This shift has significantly changed the
structure of the debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
The original pairing of the harm and legal moralist arguments
in the nineteenth century offered two competing ways to resolve
a dispute. Legal moralists could argue that the immorality of
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the offense was sufficient to enforce a prohibition, and the pro-
ponents of the harm principle could argue that the lack of
harm precluded legal enforcement. Similarly, in the 1960s and
1970s, when the debate was structured by the predominance of
the harm principle over legal moralism, there were still two
competing ways of resolving a dispute-even if there was a cer-
tain disequilibrium in the relative rhetorical force of the com-
peting arguments.
The proliferation of conservative harm arguments has
changed all that. Today the debate is characterized by a ca-
cophony of competing harm arguments without any way to re-
solve them. There is no longer an argument within the
structure of the debate to resolve the competing claims of harm.
The original harm principle was never equipped to determine
the relative importance of harms. Once a non-trivial harm ar-
gument has been made, the harm principle itself offers no fur-
ther guidance. It is silent on how to weigh the harms, balance
the harms, or judge the harms. With regard to those questions,
we need to look beyond the original harm principle and the
traditional debate over the legal enforcement of morality.
It may be wrong, however, to decry this development. The
collapse of the harm principle may ultimately be beneficial. It
may help us realize that there is probably harm in most human
activities and, in most cases, on both sides of the equation-on
the side of the persons harmed by the purported moral offense,
but also on the side of the actor whose conduct is restricted by
the legal enforcement of morality. By highlighting the harm on
both sides of the equation, the collapse of the harm principle
may help us make more informed arguments, and reach more
informed conclusions. It may force us to address the other
normative dimensions lurking beneath the conception of harm.
It may force us to carefully analyze the harm to others, as well as
the harm to the purportedly immoral actor, remembering that
the punishment itself may affect, positively or negatively, the
subject of punishment, our assessment of harm, and society as a
whole. Moreover, it may change the way that we think about
remedies. Instead of broad prohibitions that affect entire cate-
gories of moral offenses, we may instead develop more nuanced
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remedies that address particular harms. In sum, the collapse of
the harm principle may bring about a richer structure for future
debates over the legal enforcement of morals.
